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Abstract 
This MA thesis studies the attitudes of university students toward family ideals during the heightened demographic issues present in society in 21st century Japan. The ie ideology, the traditional conceptualization of family with a patriarchal head of house and 
dutiful wife who cares for the children and husband’s parents in one household, has created remnants that have furthered already present stigmatizations of nontraditional family formats, heightening the need for further research as family ideals are rapidly changing. This research study sets out to explore the attitudes of university students who have the potential to be the future generation of parents, to gather information on family-related ideals as a way to formulate a comprehension of the changing family ideals that are in part causing the demographic crisis. 
Through the use of qualitative research methods, the research results indicate that there is not just one culprit towards declining birthrates, but that there are several in that the changing family ideals have created multiple ideal families as suggested by university students. These ideals include, but are not limited to, multigenerational households, nuclear households, and single person households, with or without marriage and children, clearly distinguished from previous generations. Family has also begun to incorporate non-blood related individuals into the embodiment of family, completely changing the traditional concept for family as mandated by ie ideology. With the inclusion of more individualistic tendencies that are subsequently delaying marriage and children until later, perhaps even indefinitely, as Japanese youth are dedicating more effort towards education, careers and individual indulgences. These changing perspectives on family have created attitudes that are normalized to have few to no children, due to the presence of nontraditional family tendencies visible within society, thus, then creating divergent attitudes for family formation.  
These results incorporate the understanding of family from the perspectives of university students to better understand the fertility crisis, not from an economic perspective, but rather from a social science and sociology perspective. The inclusion of young adult ideals and views helps to further the research on the fertility issue, whilst also providing insight into the changing concept of family in the Japanese context. 
Keywords: family ideals, Japanese families, Japanese households, family-related stigma, single parenthood, illegitimacy, nontraditional families, traditional families, university students, individual collectivism, fertility, declining population, Japan.  
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1.  Introduction 
The understanding surrounding family has been much the same for millennia, with the 
distinction that “family” revolves around a commonality or “an operational manner” 
(Ueno, 2009, p. 4), such as a dinner table over which to share a meal, or a fire to cook 
over in prehistoric times. These views have changed to incorporate blood relations, 
usually a mother, father and their children, perhaps even a third generation, a mostly 
monolithic view towards family with gender normative ideals. This anthropologic view 
towards family cannot be used to distinguish “family” from “household” though, so 
defining family in respect to specific cultures is a necessity and adapting to cultural 
differences, and thus, the changes need to be fused into the definition of family. However, 
much like time, so-called “traditional” families are not unchanging from culture to culture 
(Ueno, 2009). The conceptualization of family has begun to incorporate ideals that 
individuals derive from their own beliefs on what family truly is, whether there is a blood 
relation, deviating from the preconceived notion that family is stationary. As such, it is 
imperative for empirical research to be done on Japanese families especially, because of 
the uniquely dire issue of the fertility crisis that is causing Japan’s population to shrink 
dangerously towards unsustainable levels. Research is particularly important in the 
Japanese context for the fact that family is a major player in the fertility crisis and 
evaluating the direction that the concept of family is heading towards could help with the 
fertility and societal issues plaguing Japanese society.  
It is not merely for economic reasons that researching fertility and the modern Japanese 
family is important for Japan’s future; to understand the extent of the changes taking place 
in Japanese society, particularly in Japanese families and households, an understanding 
of the stigmas and stereotypes underlying the mindset of today’s youth who will be 
tomorrow’s parents is necessary to tackle the issue to help preserve the Japanese concept 
of family while indulging the necessity for adapting to changing family norms. At its 
essence, family is the building block for society and the deterioration of family could 
bring the downfall of society as the Japanese know it. As Kumagai (2008) highlights, “the 
essence of Japanese society is an integration of both modernity and tradition”, which can 
be used to describe both society and the Japanese family system with the underlying 
stigmatization that is creating an undue precedence for the changes taking place in the 
conceptualization of family by today’s youth and tomorrow’s parents. The 
stigmatizations of marriage and family have created further changes that are drifting the 
traditional family structures heightened for the existence of the salaryman husband and 
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stay-at-home wife with their educationally minded children, towards that of a 
nontraditional model focused more on individuality and less on the attitudes toward 
childrearing, inevitably decreasing fertility and rapidly causing a crisis to emerge. 
Research into Japanese families is of particular interest today, because of the presence of 
Japan’s fertility crisis within society. Professor Hisao Endo, Director-General of the 
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, deems Japan’s population 
challenges as “complex and difficult” as the rest of the world is attentively watching to 
see how Japan will react and combat the low-fertility issues, rapidly ageing society, and 
other demographic challenges. He indicated that other Asian countries and the Western 
world as well will face similar population issues in the coming years, and that how Japan 
reacts will assist those countries in finding their own solutions (National Institute of 
Population and Social Security Research, 2017). The issues Japan is facing in terms of 
population is the first ever encounter, making it essential for Japan to take precautions 
and not to misstep on their mission to solve the fertility crisis.  
Japan’s total fertility rate (TFR)1 has been waning since the end-set of the second world 
war, with more than halving from 4.54 in 1947 to 2.04 ten-years later in 1957. The famed 
“1.57 shock” in 1989 brought the fertility crisis to the forefront of the government’s 
agenda with government initiatives targeted at improving childcare placements, parental 
leave practices, and incentives for having more children. The government initiatives have 
done little to increase the TFR and as recent as 2005, the TFR dipped to 1.26 children per 
woman, becoming the lowest the TFR has been in the post-war era (Ogawa, 2011, p. 167). 
The staggering decreases in rates heightens the imperativeness of figuring out exactly 
what the route cause in the change in attitude towards having children is and finding a 
solution to upping the rates closer towards the sustainable rate of 2.1. Ogawa (2011) 
hypothesizes that if the current rates continue at a steady pace, the future generations 
would decrease by “approximately 35 percent per generation”, heightening the dangers 
of the constant decrease for future generations. The trends in Japan’s demographic 
changes are being termed as Japan’s second demographic transition by demographers and 
denotes post 1973 era trends in TFR but lacks in describing the age-gap that has occurred 
subsequent to the fertility declines. 
                                               
1 The total fertility rate (TFR) is calculated by averaging the total number of children birthed by women during their entire lifespan. The OECD estimates that a total fertility rate of 2.1 would ensure population stability when including migration and mortality rates into a given society (OECD, 2019). 
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Another issue related to family are stigmas. Stigmas have become a part of everyday life, 
with negative attributes being applied to families away from the “ordinary family” in 
which a husband works, wife takes care of the children, household, and the grandparents. 
As stigmas have become a major undercurrent in the family formation scene in Japan, 
could stigmas be viewed as a pseudo “invisible hand” that is pushing values and attitudes 
towards a transformational period never before seen in Japanese society? With next to no 
literature pertaining to the existence of stigmas in Japanese families, but rather 
generalized mentions written in passing, is there an increasing need for research steered 
toward understanding this new wave of family-related stigmas is necessary to understand 
the direction the concept of family is moving towards within Japanese society? According 
to Dovidio, Major and Crocker (2000), stigma is viewed as “a social construction, shaped 
by cultural and historical forces”, combined with high density populations within major 
metropolitan areas, limited natural resources for agricultural output, and long, extensive 
history dating back millennia (Matsumoto, Kudoh, & Takeuchi, Changing Patterns of 
Individualism and Collectivism in the United States and Japan, 1996), the said definition 
of stigma fits perfectly into understanding how stigmas are an underlying current within 
Japanese society, as well as many other countries with collectivist periods in the past. The 
historical prejudice towards having children out of wedlock, adopting outside of blood 
relations, marrying a non-Japanese partner, and raising children as a single parent, have 
created stigmas that are implicitly forbidden within society. Stigmatization within 
Japanese society is majorly implicit and comprehensive research needs to be conducted 
to further understand how stigmas are having an influence on the changes within Japanese 
families as fertility continues to decline to detrimental numbers.  
1.1 Family-related Issues in Contemporary Japan 
Japanese traditional cultures, specifically those of family dynamics, roles, and structures 
demand holistic analysis for the causes behind the dramatic reduction in fertility rates that 
have taken place in recent years. Cultural changes in today’s Japan are seen through the 
observations of single-and-nuclear-family households as they witness changes happening 
to and within their populations with the changing perspectives on having children and 
getting married. These changes show the influence of internationalization in Japan after 
isolationism ended and the onset of the economic crisis and stalemate at the end of the 
1980s. Through the reinforcement of family planning practices and schemes, the Japanese 
government has made it evident that the demographic crisis is of utmost importance, with 
10/86 
needs for further research to be done to help alleviate the pressures from future 
generations.  
Research into the topic of traditional family cultures, specifically those pertaining to 
family formation and the stigmas that are preventing the systematic acceptance of new 
family models in society, are essential to fully understand the detriment Japan’s 
population is facing and will continue to face in the coming years and how the concept of 
family is shifting to fit the new views of young adults. Previous research has been 
conducted to understand aspects of the fertility crisis and have even spurred the Japanese 
government to implement family friendly policies to ensure that there are incentives for 
having children, and yet, there are very little signs of improvement for the future of 
improving the state of the fertility rates, with projections showing that the population will 
continue a downward spiral as the total fertility rate decreases below the replacement rate.  
With the clear lack of research done on the stigmas that are halting the transition of 
thoughts and views for the acceptance of nontraditional family types, including, but not 
limited to, single parenthood, and children out of wedlock, or illegitimate children, 
Japan’s ineffective governmental plans are catering to old traditional family models and 
fail to acknowledge nontraditional families effectively. Additionally, there is the evidence 
of a void in the research toward fertility in Japan, which I hypothesize is the increased 
focus towards family planning and lack in actual family formation programs for the 
potential future generations that will have children in the years to come who are more 
inclined to have attitudes toward nontraditional family models with the increase in 
education pushed for by Japanese parents and the government (Choe, Bumpass, Tsuya, 
& Rindfuss, June 2014, p. 242). The void is a direct result of the government formulating 
policies and incentive programs for their generations and the generations prior to the 
future generation of parents, causing the new implementations to not work for the mindset 
of potential future parents, particularly those Japanese men and women who are currently 
18 to 30 years of age and will begin forming their own families, hypothetically, in the 
next five to fifteen years.  
The 1.57 shock has not seen improvements in recent decades. As of 2015, Japan’s fertility 
rate has been at approximately 1.5 according to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. The OECD estimates that a “rate of 2.1 children per 
woman ensures a broadly stable population” (OECD, 2018), showing that Japan is far 
from being stable in the coming years, and that Japan will remain in their state of societa l 
and developmental stagnancy that has been present since the 1.57 shock occurred in 1989. 
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OECD’s 2014 dataset on the share of births outside of marriage estimate that 2.3 percent2  
of births are ones out of wed-lock (OECD, 2014) with statistics on childless women ages 
40-44 unavailable through data collected by the OECD. 
In Japan, it is estimated that every “1 in 6 children live[] in poverty” with 55 percent of 
children in single parent families (Hagiware & Reynolds, 2015), making it increasingly 
necessary to research the attitudes of university students who will potentially be the new 
generation of parents. With “relatively equal access to education,” children in families in 
poverty have less chances to continue their education as they age, with about 90 percent 
of children in poor families being able to go to high schools, and the remaining 10 percent 
going straight to the workforce. After high school, only less than 20 percent of 
impoverished students go on to university (Hagiware & Reynolds, 2015). A reason for 
these statistics is the income of the parents, since higher education costs in Japan. The 
financial burden placed on parents makes it difficult to have children, much less likely 
for men and women to decide to have children on their own or even potentially adopt.  
Furthermore, career centric individuals hold off on marriage and children until later due 
to the increased costs of having children and the demands of the work life in Japan.   
However, prevailing stigmas are not deterring determined women from being able to be 
“single mothers by choice”. In 2017, Japan Times reported about the organization SMC, 
or Single Mother by Choice, an organization established in 2014 that is dedicated to 
providing women comprehensive information on reproduction as well as giving single 
mothers by choice the opportunity to interact with like-minded mothers, since such 
groups have not been represented previously (Masangkay, 2017). The organization’s 
definition of a “single mother by choice” is a mother who “chooses before pregnancy to 
give birth without getting married and raise the child on her own”, a definition that goes 
against many societal rules that have been in place for over a century. In addition to 
societal stigmas, the lack of sperm banks and third-party sperm donation options lower 
the options available for hopeful single mothers to be, leaving many women with only 
the choice of getting pregnant without marriage being in the picture (Masangkay, 2017). 
Single parenthood is difficult financially, but single mothers have the added stress of 
societal stigmas associated with having children out of wed-lock. To help lessen the 
                                               
2 During the decade prior to and the decade after the 1.57 shock, the illegitimacy rate was at a steady one-percent, however has been growing slowly, but steadily in recent years (Goodman R. , 2002, p. 13). From a differing perspective, the birthrate for illegitimate children has increased the overall fertility rate, and the decreasing prioritization of marriage could help increase the TFR for years to come.  
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burdens on single parents in general, the Japanese government has enacted a child support 
allowance for children of single parents, but the allowance did not factor in the differences 
between single mothers and single fathers until August 2010 (IPSSR, 2014, p. 48). Single 
fathers have higher chances of finding employment, while the employment rate of single 
mothers in Japan is only at 81 percent (Brasor & Tsubuku, 2015), which explains the 
delayed changes in child support allowances. Additionally, the governmental programs 
have income thresholds that have strict guidelines that a person might be disqualified 
from if their income is just barely over the limit (Hagiware & Reynolds, 2015). On 
another note, for nearly every 6 single mothers, there is only 1 single father, showing a 
disparity between single parents (Brasor & Tsubuku, 2015) and a heightened need to 
decrease the gender gap that is creating further stigmatization.    
Even though financial support exists for single parents, these laws on childrearing support 
does not include single parents by choice. Thus, single mothers by choice are not eligible 
for state support that single mothers by divorce or death are, such as tax-reductions, lower 
fees on childcare placement or monthly assistance money for food. In most cases, single 
mothers are relying on the assistance of relatives, but in cases where no relative is 
available to assist, childhood poverty rates are increasing, at an astonishing 21.9 percent 
for single parent households (Shirahase, 2014). However, in 2018 the Ministry of Health, 
Labor and Welfare plans to review the current laws to give unmarried parents state 
support to help pay for their childrearing costs, to give their children better opportunities 
for success (Kyodo, 2017). Better assistance could also lessen the burden of paying for 
childcare centers as well as finding placements, which are becoming exceedingly more 
difficult, even when there is a shortage of children (Wingfield-Hayes, 2013). A lack of 
support has increased the rate of poverty among single-parent households, especially for 
single mother households due to the employment and income disparity present. Until 
better support is offered to a wider spectrum of parents, the present problems will prevail 
with both fertility, poverty rates and balance of work and daily life, with single parent 
households remaining in the minority (Shirahase, 2014). 
1.2 The Purpose of This MA Thesis 
With the combination of changes in fertility and family-related stigmas, this thesis 
focuses on examining the attitudes of young people in Japan, many of whom will be 
parents in the future, to get an understanding of and analyze the changing family culture 
that is helping to create the fertility crisis in Japan and, thus, fueling the changing family 
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ideals through nontraditional values that are becoming predominant amongst 
educationally driven individuals. Through a structured questionnaire targeted towards 
Japanese university students in the 18 to 30 age cohort, group discussion with a small 
similar-in-age group of university students, and in-depth research on theories, concepts 
and literature pertaining to fertility, family, households and the stigmas associated with 
family, such as single parenthood, and illegitimacy within the concept of family, this 
thesis examines how stigmas are creating changes in attitudes toward having children and 
the future family formation3 by parents in five to fifteen years. Additionally, this study 
looks to find answers to the following questions:  
 What is the relationship between traditional Japanese family models and the 
family ideals imbued by today’s youth? 
 How has family changed, from the traditional ie family to the new nontraditional 
family ideal? 
 Have traditional family ideals created stigmas in the development of Japanese 
family ideals? 
With the assistance of a conceptual framework dedicated towards highlighting the 
conceptualization of family within Japanese society, stigmas within family changes with 
the presence of historically rooted modern-day taboos, and last but not least, individual 
collectivism and the Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis as concepts in explaining attitudinal 
changes among young adults and potential future parents. By focusing on different 
aspects of the fertility crisis, but not focusing directly on fertility, I hope to understand 
the underlying causes for fertility within Japanese society through the changing 
perspectives and ideologies within family and the attitudinal changes that are preventing 
the TFR from increasing nearer towards the replacement level.  
For the purpose of the research study, this MA thesis will be structured with the following 
format. First, I will highlight the key literature available on the concept of family in the 
Japanese context, with special attention paid to the traditional versus the nontraditional 
                                               
3 For the purpose of this MA thesis, I have purposefully decided to steer away from using the term “family 
planning” and have decided to instead use the term “family formation”, since the focus of this thesis is the conceptualization of the Japanese family and the future formation of families with respect towards the prevailing stigmas. As such, this thesis is not written for the purpose of understanding the changes happening to views toward the actual act or decision of creating a family, such as deciding on when is the right time to have a family, birth control, assisted reproductive technology (or ART for short), etc., nor will this study examine fertility as its main focus, but rather the idea of family in itself. Using “family formation” will provide an easier distinction towards explaining the two and, thus, differentiate the two in terminology and meaning, and not confuse the topic, purpose or target of the research. 
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family ideals, the ie ideology and concepts connected, family formation patterns, and 
single parenthood and illegitimacy as stigmas within Japanese society. Secondly, I will 
formulate a framework for processing and analyzing the attitudes toward Japanese 
families by university students, which include a conceptualization of family with definite 
meanings laid out, stigmas within Japanese society, individual collectivism as an 
explanation for decreasing family formation, and the Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis as 
further reasoning for nontraditional family ideals. Thirdly, I will discuss the analytical 
tools for conducting this research thesis with insight into the research process and 
fieldwork. Fourthly, I will detail the results of the fieldwork and answers to the 
questionnaire on family ideals and attitudes as answered by university students. The 
analysis will then make way for the discussion chapter where I will answer the thesis 
questions as well as further analyze the data results with the compilation of literature, 
conceptual framework and research results as laid out previously. The format mentioned 
above will, therefore, bring this thesis to the culminating points in concluding chapter as 
well as highlight further research opportunities and possibilities this thesis brings into 
light.  
 
*** 
 
This study was conducted for a master’s thesis, and as such, acknowledgement needs to 
be voiced on the limitations of the study and methodology. The originality of this thesis 
shows that prior research has not been done of this nature in reference to university 
students’ attitudes toward families and family-related stigmas as a way to gauge student 
opinions on the demographic issues taking place in Japan. As such, it should be noted that 
this study has seen trial and error. It is acknowledged that aspects of this study could have 
been carried out differently, such as different methods for acquiring data, different 
questions with a possible pilot study to weed out questions unnecessary for the expected 
outcomes, different sample as well as wider sample size that grasps other young adult 
cohorts, etc. Even with the limitations this MA thesis has posed, it is firmly believed that 
this study has provided invaluable, though limited, information towards the study of the 
attitudes of university students. As such, it needs to be noted that any and all faults and 
errors in the thesis are those of the author.  
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2.  Previous Research on Japanese Families, Fertility and the 
Underlying Stigmatization 
Through the review of literature, I hope to briefly synthesize a comprehensive perspective 
on Japanese families, historically and presently, the concept of ie as a manifestation of 
the Japanese family, the fertility crisis and its role in society, the current governmental 
implementations targeted at improving the benefits of having children, as well as 
literature associated with the stigmatization of nontraditional family models. By creating 
a clear understanding of Japanese families and society, I envisage the beginning of my 
research towards understanding the wants and needs of the future generation of parents 
for methods to incentivize Japanese family formation practices, and, thus, to help 
understand how Japan could best proceed towards increasing fertility rates and lessening 
the impact of stigmas on single parenthood, illegitimacy and adoption.  
2.1 Studying the Transformation from Traditional to 
Contemporary Family 
To fully comprehend the trends developing in Japanese society towards family planning, 
it is important to understand the core of the Japanese family structure. Family, or ie, in 
the Japanese context was initially created through government planning in the late 1800s 
by the Meiji government. Prior to the creation of the Meiji Civil Code, multigenerational 
families dominated the family scene during the dominion of the samurai class, with 10 
percent of the families in Japan being represented by the samurai and their extended 
family households, while the remaining 90 percent composed of a more varied structures 
of family (Ueno, 2009, p. 63). According to Ueno (2009), the “conventional” definition 
of ie is that of a physical household regarded as a being away from the individual family 
members, meaning that ie as “an extended family ha[s] its physical foundations: shared 
family business, shared family name, shared family house, shared family property and 
shared family finances” (p. 5), with the unconventional definition as a family form 
deviating from the perceived notion of family. Sugimoto (1997) explains that “ie 
represents a quasi-kinship unit with a patriarchal head and members tied to him through 
real or symbolic blood relationship” (p. 137) emphasizing the male dominance asserted 
as the central component, which helped generate the family value system visible today. 
The notion that the ie is an extension of the physical family shows the high regard given 
to family and that regard is persisting still today, with high emphasis still given to families 
within Japanese society. Therefore, subtle stigmas are placed upon nontraditional family 
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models, like the ones that diverge away from the normal family institution as dictated by 
the ie ideology.  
Traditionally, Japanese families have been rooted with Confucian beliefs, especially those 
of filial piety and a dedication towards family, with an emphasis on the patriarchal 
household (Alexy & Ronald, 2011) where a woman would move into her husband’s 
family after marriage and she would then have “two families of procreations: her own 
and her son’s” (Kumagai, 2014: 5) where she would live with her son’s family in the 
future, in a stem, or multigenerational, family. However, the New Civil Code of 1947 
brought the official destruction of the Japanese family system, taking away the emphasis 
on multigenerational, or stem-family households, and brought gender equality with the 
destruction of the patriarchal household system of the old code (Sugimoto, 1997).  
Additionally, the post-war era saw a surprisingly slow increase in the already dominating 
nuclear families with corelated rising need for productivity for the salaryman husband 
and the diligent housewife (sengyou shufu) who raises the educationally driven children 
(Alexy & Ronald, 2011: 5; Vogel & Vogel, 2013). Though the popular belief is that the 
Japanese nuclear family is skyrocketing, in all actuality there has been a steady fluctuation 
in nuclear families with different types of households, from multi-generational families 
to single-person households. However, with stem-families becoming continuously less 
popular in projections for 2030, (Kumagai, 2008, 2014) and 2065 (IPSSR, 2018) single-
person households are expected to dominate in years to come (Kumagai, 2014, p. 14), 
showing a grim future for the sustainability of multi-generational households, and even 
nuclear households.  
Hendry (2012), in Understanding Japanese Society, gives a detailed structuring of family 
through history as well as how the ie family system has been changing through Japan’s 
globalization and that there is “no longer a physical ie which has been passed down 
through the generations” (Hendry, 2012, p. 31). Additionally, Hendry explains that the 
discord between the current childrearing generation and the elders is increasing the 
distance from ie and respect for the ancestors who have passed on, giving multiple 
perspectives on the changing family cultures in Japan (p. 33), with differing perspectives 
to those of Kumagai (2014) and Alexy and Ronald (2011). Hendry conceptualizes the 
term ie with its basic Japanese meaning of “house” and referring to it as a physical shrine 
for the ancestors, present family, and the future generations (Hendry, 2012, p. 25).  
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Furthermore, Kumagai and Hendry analyze how marriage has changed, marrying for 
love, an increase in couples living together without children, to even families consisting 
of a child or multiple children and only one parent, deviating away from the traditional 
nuclear family scheme, and touch upon the impacts these changes are having on the 
population and elderly in the long term. Goodman (2002) and Mackie (2002) point out 
that “politicians not only work on this assumption, but they also help to legitimate, 
reinforce and even possibly construct it” (Goodman, 2002, p. 15) that “people live in 
heterosexual nuclear families with a male breadwinner and female primary caregiver” 
(Mackie, 2002, p. 206) to fit the popular traditionalistic viewpoint towards family. 
Matsumoto (2002) takes another look at Japanese families and marriage patterns by 
looking at the changing patterns of men and women wanting to get married, and the 
lessening stigmatization towards divorce, highlighting the term batsu ichi, or “one strike”, 
to emphasize that having “one or even two divorces are really ‘no big deal’” (Matsumoto, 
2002, p. 83), bringing to the forefront that views towards marriage, children and 
relationships are changing. However, these sources are lacking in research dedicated to 
the connection of the trends and patterns that could lead to further data dedicated to the 
understanding of the voices of the next generation of parents and how to improve family 
formation that better fit the needs of the next childrearing generation with the increases 
in the focus on stigmatization, nor do they point towards stigmas as a major cause for 
concern in the hinderance taboos are creating within Japanese society. 
2.2 Literature on Patterns in Family Formation, Single 
Parenthood and Illegitimacy 
To explain the low fertility rates seen in Japan, two common reasons are given: firstly, 
people are waiting until later to get married and have children, so as not to miss out on 
promotions within their companies, and secondly, married couples are not having 
children at all or just having fewer than their previous counterparts due to rising costs of 
having children (Shirahase, 2014). These reasonings for the current state of affairs for 
fertility in Japan have resulted in the acceptance of low fertility as well as lessening 
acknowledgement by future parents to their responsibility in becoming parents and 
helping increase fertility rates, creating a societal and an economic issue. As Goodman 
notes in his research on Japanese society through an anthropological lens, it is a 
“mistake..[]to suggest that the state can impose its social policy on a passive populace” 
who do not follow the heed of societal crises over those of their purely selfish reasonings 
for existence, making it so that when the state implements policies from the crying 
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demands of the population, such as the parents of yesteryear, the needs of the population 
have shifted towards those of the parents of tomorrow, the present generation of 
university students. Hence, the current policy implementations are not having the desired 
impact in society as the government predicted. Goodman invokes that it is a necessity of 
the “intermediary institutions such as mass media” to embody the needs of the population, 
however, mass media tends to fixate on other issues over those of long term issues such 
as the current fertility crisis (Goodman R. , 2002, pp. 6-7). 
With times changing and long traditions of arranged marriage waning and discrimination 
against illegitimate children and inheritance laws slowly lessening as of late 2013 
(Kumagai, 2014), an increasing number of young women are choosing to not have 
children at all. However, a new pattern has emerged where women are choosing to have 
children, but without the assistance of the fathers. These changing patterns have led to 
lower birthrates due to the reverberation of social stigmas and pressures from olden times 
due to the need to follow the ie ideology of marriage between a man and a woman that is 
still persisting today. According to Kumagai, Japan’s traditional family system, ie, is one 
of the leading reasons many are discouraged from “challenging the social norm” because 
of the fact that marriage is supposed to be based on a contract between man and woman; 
thus, creating a stigma about single parenthood as well as illegitimate children and non-
heteronormative relationships. Sugimoto (1997) explores the issue of illegitimacy as a 
consequence of the traditional ie ideology, emphasizing the concept of koseki, or 
household registration, that is a part of the patriarchal design of the Civil Code. The koseki 
establishes a household register with the husband as the head of household, connecting 
family members with a common surname, so children born out of wedlock have less 
advantages within society if they are not a part of their father’s household register. 
Furthermore, under the Civil Code, children born out of wed-lock were not entitled to the 
same inheritance privileges as siblings who are born to wed parents, with only the right 
to claim half of what the other siblings are eligible to inherit until the discriminatory 
regulations were repealed only in 2013 (Sugimoto, 1997; Yuki, 2013), showing a clear 
stigmatization towards children born out of wedlock and parents who have children 
before marriage.  
2.3 Stigmas as Road Block for Family Formation 
In Japanese society, it has become more common for young people to want to marry for 
the sake of love or not have kids at all, transforming the traditional ie family. With the 
idea of women in the workplace increasing, men and women are starting to marry later in 
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life to focus on their careers, thus, having children later or not at all, and many 
publications support these notions with visible evidence that the ie concept of family is 
transforming (Alexy & Ronald, 2011; Government of Japan, 2016; Hendry, 2012; 
Sugimoto, 1997; Sugimura & Mizokami, 2013, White, 2002). According to Kumagai, 
Japan has a “social norm that ‘everyone should get married’” (Kumagai, 2014, p. 56), 
making it difficult for women to even have children when they are not married, because 
of the societal stigmas associated with illegitimate children. On the other hand, White 
(2002) explains that “most people say that without children life is incomplete” (p. 100), 
showing the dilemma that arises from the pressures to marry and have children. The 
stigmatization of marriage and children are due to the lingering presence of the ie family 
structure and the long history of pressures to marry within Japanese society, have created 
a rift where it is less usual for young generations in Japan today to abide by the long held 
ideals.  
New phenomenon emerging in Japan are the concepts of “ikumen”, or fathers rearing 
children, as well as the Iku-Boss Project Alliance by Fathering Japan and MHLW that is 
trying to encourage executive level fathers to become models for others as “family dads”. 
These projects are new methods created to try to increase the Work-life Balance of parents 
in Japan. The Child Care Leave Act gives fathers 52 weeks of paid paternity leave, so 
that they can be a part of raising the children. The 2010 Ikumen Project by the Ministry 
of Health, Labor, and Welfare was created to encourage more fathers to take paternity 
leave, because only about 4% of fathers take the guaranteed leave (MHLW, 2014). Could 
the apparent removal of societal stigmas associated with fathers staying at home and 
caring for children, provide women with further opportunities for their paths in the 
workforce and potentially create less stigmatization for women to not stay at home with 
children? However, removing the stigmas from men only and not women, shows a distinct 
paradox in gender relations that is preventing women from being able to have the same 
attitudinal changes that men are easily given opportunities for, especially with the 
constant pressure to get married and have children that have stigmatized having children 
outside of wedlock.  
Roberts (2002) and White (2002) explore other efforts for increasing childbearing, such 
as the Gold Plan (1990), the later New Gold Plan (1995) and Gold Plan 21 (2000) to 
increase the availability of short term nursing homes and community centers (Goodman, 
2002, pp. 14-15), the revised Angel Plans (1999, 2003) that were termed as the Five Year 
Plan for Emergency Childcare that provide assistance in childcare placements (Roberts, 
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2002), Comprehensive After-School Plan for Children (2014), and the Family-Care 
Leave Act which promotes partial paid leave to care for family members (White, Perfectly 
Japanese: Making Families in an Era of Upheaval, 2002, p. 101). According to Roberts 
and White, these programs show the benefits of the programs that the Japanese 
government has implemented to try to incentivize individuals and couples to have 
children, while still maintaining careers outside of the home (Government of Japan, 
2016). These programs also emphasized important tasks to take up for the “improvement 
of childrearing support measures” to help with childbearing and to better understand the 
“realization of young people’s hope for marriage and childbirth” (Government of Japan, 
2016, p. 29); however, these measures have not seen the desired outcome of increasing 
the birthrate to 1.8 per household (Government of Japan, 2016), as these government 
initiatives have failed to raise awareness of societal issues surrounding having children. 
White (2002) further emphasizes the discord between the national leaders and institutions 
versus those of the public in terms of the meaning and definition of “childbearing and 
child rearing” (p. 101), showing that the views for having children are not as aligned 
horizontally as they should be, tearing the presumptions of the governing bodies away 
from those of university students and young adults who will potentially be having children 
in the coming years.  
Kumagai also clarifies statistics and tables related to Japanese families, especially in 
relation to family size and the increase in the aging population with the top-heavy 
distribution of the elderly in comparison to the new generations as the birthrate 
continually decreases. Kumagai demonstrates that in 2010, 88.7% of households were 
outside traditional stem-family norms, showing a clear decrease contrary to the “future 
projections […] suggest[ing] that the nuclear family” might not become a universal 
occurrence, with projections suggesting a decrease of nuclear families to 51.5% and 
single-person household to increase to 37.4% by 2030 (Kumagai, 2014: 14; Fig. 2.2). The 
future typical Japanese family will, hence, resemble the much idolized nuclear family or 
the increasingly popular individual person household model, making the future of family 
formation unclear in terms of predictive patterns, with the possibility of the destruction 
of stem-families and nuclear households as today’s youth and tomorrow’s parents inch 
closer to individualistic ideals as gathered by the new conceptualization of 
“individualistic collectivism”. 
As the focus of my research centers around the attitudes toward family ideals by Japanese 
university students, it is essential to understand the future generation of parents, i.e. the 
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young adults in Japanese society, particularly those on the path of education who will 
begin rearing children in five to fifteen years’ time. Though societally collectivist 
throughout various points of history, Sugimura and Mizokami (2013) emphasize that 
Japanese youth are becoming more individualistic in values, thus, leaning further towards 
a value system centered around “individualistic collectivism” where individuals look out 
for themselves, while still being willing to work towards the common goal of improving 
society. White (2002) explores the resilience of the Confucian ie in that the family 
becomes an extension of the nation, that prospering within the household benefits the 
nation as a whole. These have been evident in the changes from the school-to-work 
formula to the school-to-university-to-career formula, thus, making it so that adolescents 
begin to think about their futures earlier than their parents and grandparents (Sugimura & 
Mizokami, 2013, p. 135); hence, pushing marriage and children until much later on in 
life. The struggle between “individualism” and “collectivism” is seen through the want 
of young adults to have children, but through the entrance into the workforce, it becomes 
clear that it is much harder to give up on a career path for a childrearing path without high 
intrinsic needs for wanting children. Further research by White (2002) on Japanese 
families from the “child-centered” family perspective gives insight into the overzealous 
attitudes of parents for rearing their children towards the path of education with the 
heightened idea that not pursuing education is a failure and “deviant” from the expected 
course of life (p. 102). White’s perspective of the “elemental” Japanese family also shows 
that getting married and having children are an expected part of life, rather than “part of 
a dream of individual happiness” (p. 99). These ideals that family is an extension of the 
nation show that there is a dire need to fully reevaluate the concept of ie in terms of the 
nation versus the public. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
Existing literature shows that the concept of ie has transformed within the past century. 
Research by Japan experts helped develop literature into the transformation of the modern 
concept of the Japanese family, one which heightens the importance of family within the 
Japanese context and how the definition of family has changed from prehistoric times to 
incorporate modern definitions and ideals. With the evolving concept of households, a 
decrease has is seen through the depletion of multigenerational households, in contrast to 
the increasing amounts of nuclear households that have been on the rise since the 20 th 
century, but there have been surprising increases in single-person households, as young 
adults are living alone and choosing not to marry nor create their own families as they 
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continually dedicate their time towards careers and educations. With the changing 
household types, stigmas have become ever present with nontraditional family formats, 
such as single parenthood as well as children born outside of wedlock. These 
nontraditional families have, thus, seen discrimination by their traditional family 
counterparts within society and their communities.   
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3.  Conceptual Framework 
Whilst the previous chapter focused on the definition of family within the Japanese 
context in literature, the prevalence of the fertility crisis in Japanese society, changing 
patterns and trends in the evolution of traditional Japanese families to nontraditional ones, 
and the underlying stigmatization associated with present-day attitudes towards having 
children today and in the future, this next chapter will focus on the conceptual framework. 
With the conceptual framework I will make way for the final analysis on the family ideals 
by Japanese university students, and the issue of stigmas from the view point of university 
students as family models are constantly adapting to the new mindset of potential future 
parents. A conceptual framework will provide the grounds for understanding the main 
aspects and views towards Japanese families and the current changes taking place in 
hopes of fully comprehending the views on family by university students.  
For the purpose of this conceptual framework, I have decided to explore the following 
concepts and phenomena: the meaning of the Japanese family, from nuclear and 
multigenerational to single-person households as the ever-changing concept of the family, 
ie; stigmatization of Japanese taboos to help differentiate stigma from taboo to better 
understand the interconnectedness of the underlying stigmatization towards changing 
family attitudes and nontraditional family ideals; individual collectivism and its role in 
the internal and external influences on Japan’s youth for wanting children but retaining 
workforce eligibility and personal freedoms; and finally, the vicious circle of the Low-
Fertility Trap Hypothesis that is creating a skewed attitude toward family. Through a 
conceptual framework that includes each of these separate entities geared towards 
understanding Japanese families and social stigmas, I hope to create a comprehensive 
framework that analyzes the primary issues surrounding changing family ideals to pave a 
path for the forthcoming analysis chapter with clearly defined principles. 
3.1 Conceptualization of Family and its Meaning  
Family, or ie, in the Japanese context was initially created through government planning 
in the late 1800s by the Meiji government as aforesaid. Prior to the creation of the Meiji 
Civil Code, multigenerational families dominated the family scene during the dominion 
of the samurai class, with only a fraction of families represented by the samurai and their 
extended family households and the majority with more varied forms of family (Ueno, 
2009, p. 63). Sugimoto (1997) explains that “ie represents a quasi-kinship unit with a 
patriarchal head and members tied to him through real or symbolic blood relationship” 
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(p. 137) which helped generate the family value system that is still present today. 
Furthermore, Ueno’s notion that the ie is an extension of the physical family shows the 
high regard given to family and that regard is persisting still today, with high emphasis 
still given to families within Japanese society, and subtle stigmas being placed upon 
nontraditional family models, such as the ones that diverge away from the normal family 
institution as commanded by ie.  
Traditionally, Japanese families have been rooted with Confucian beliefs, especially those 
of filial piety and a dedication towards family, with an emphasis on the patriarchal 
household (Alexy & Ronald, 2011) where a woman would move into her husband’s 
family after marriage and she would then have “two families of procreations: her own 
and her son’s” (Kumagai, 2014: 5) where she would live with her son’s family in the 
future, in a stem, or multigenerational, family. However, the New Civil Code of 1947 
brought the official destruction of the Japanese family system, taking away the emphasis 
on multigenerational, or stem-family households. Additionally, the post-war era saw a 
surprisingly slow increase in the already dominating nuclear families with corelated rising 
need for productivity for the salaryman husband and the diligent housewife (sengyou 
shufu) who raises the educationally driven children (Alexy & Ronald, 2011: 5; Vogel & 
Vogel, 2013). Though the popular belief is that the Japanese nuclear family is 
skyrocketing, in all actuality there has been a steady fluctuation in nuclear families with 
different types of households, from multi-generational families to single-person 
households. However, with stem-families becoming continuously less popular in 
projections for 2030, (Kumagai, 2008, 2014) and 2065 (IPSSR, 2018) single-person 
households are expected to dominate in years to come (Kumagai, 2014, p. 14), showing 
a grim future for the sustainability of multi-generational households, and even nuclear 
households.  
The Japanese ie has seen dramatic changes in recent decades, with shifts from 
multigenerational, or stem, family models with high filial piety, or respect for elders, to 
nuclear families with a gender normative couple and their educationally driven children. 
The abolishment of the official ie system came with the new constitution in 1947, giving 
equality to wives and not just husbands in previous establishments of the ie (Himeoka, 
2008). Additionally, attitudes have been changing in regard to family in recent years to 
incorporate an increasingly popular conceptualization of family in respect to the 
physicality of families, such as single person households with few to no children, with 
majority of households consisting of nuclear family styles as opposed to those of 
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multigenerational households from previous generations. These changing attitudes are in 
line with the changing perspectives of the youth and young adults that will be discussed 
further in chapters 3.3 Individual Collectivism as a Downfall for Family Formation and 
3.4 Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis as a Vicious Circle for Nontraditional Family Ideals.  
Hendry (2012) structures the Japanese family throughout history and how the ie family 
has been changing through Japan’s globalization and that there is “no longer a physical 
ie which has been passed down through the generations” (Hendry, 2012, p. 31), which 
heightens the notion that Japanese families are changing. Hendry also notes that the 
discord between the current childrearing generation and the elders is increasing the 
distance from ie and respect for the ancestors who have passed on, giving multiple 
perspectives on the changing family cultures in Japan (p. 33), with differing perspectives 
to those of Kumagai (2014) and Alexy and Ronald (2011). Hendry and Alexy and Ronald 
conceptualize the term ie with its basic Japanese meaning of “house” and referring to it 
as a physical shrine for the ancestors, present family, and the future generations (Alexy 
and Ronald, 2011; Hendry, 2012, p. 25).  
Kumagai and Hendry analyze that marriage in Japan has changed dramatically in that 
young adults and adults are marrying for love or not marrying at all, a concept that has 
been stigmatized societally with the ingrained idea that everyone needs to marry. 
Additionally, the act of divorcing has become more prevalent at higher rates with 
lessening stigmatization that Matsumoto (2002) indicates through his research on 
individualism and collectivism within the youth and adults in Japanese society, and that 
there has been an increase in couples living together without children and/or without 
marrying in common-law marriages. Each of these observations denote an underlying 
shift in attitudes towards family formation as validated by Choe, Bumpass, Tsuya, and 
Rindfuss (2014) in their analysis on nontraditional attitudes toward family with increasing 
emphasis on pathways toward education and pushing family formation until later in life; 
however, they stress that their results do not show great change, even with the shift away 
from traditional changes. Additionally, Himeoka (2008) expounds that ie and the 
“modern family” are separate entities and that ie-like characteristics can be used to frame 
Japanese families, but that ie does not define the family (pp. 237-8), furthermore stressing 
that the traditional ie is falling away from current family formation patterns. Additionally, 
Himeoka illustrates that there is a separation of private family life with the workplace 
within the modern family, with the mother devoting herself to housework and the children 
as the father works (p. 242). but this view is not visible in today’s model of family as 
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women are continually joining the workforce, begging the question of what is the 
“modern family”?  
Special attention is paid by researchers to shifting family models. Such models include 
couples living without children to even families consisting one parent, generally a single 
mom as single dads are rare, and one to few children, deviating away from the traditional 
nuclear family scheme that has been praised as the norm and ideal in Japanese society. 
Goodman (2002) and Mackie (2002) point out that “politicians not only work on this 
assumption, but they also help to legitimate, reinforce and even possibly construct it” 
(Goodman, 2002, p. 15) that “people live in heterosexual nuclear families with a male 
breadwinner and female primary caregiver” (Mackie, 2002, p. 206) to fit the popular 
traditionalistic viewpoint towards family to try to deviate others away from nontraditional 
family models, which is supported by Takenobu (2004) and White (2002). Matsumoto 
(2002) takes another look at Japanese families and marriage patterns by looking at the 
changing patterns of men and women wanting to get married, and the lessening 
stigmatization towards divorce, highlighting the term batsu ichi, or “one strike”, to 
emphasize that having “one or even two divorces are really ‘no big deal’” (Matsumoto, 
2002, p. 83), bringing to the forefront that views towards marriage, children and 
relationships are changing. However, these sources are lacking in research dedicated to 
the connection of the trends and patterns that could lead to further data dedicated to the 
Japanese family will look like for the next generation of parents. Additionally, the sources 
hesitate to formulate how to improve family formation that better fit the needs of the next 
childrearing generation with the increases in stigmatization, nor do they point towards 
stigmas as a major cause for concern in the hinderance taboos are creating within Japanese 
society. 
The Japanese family is shifting in such rapid succession that finding one true definition 
has become obsolete. Journalist Mieko Takenobu expertly summarizes the Japanese 
family in her article in Women’s Asia 21: Voices from Japan (2004): “Although a high 
value placed on ‘family bonds,’ people continue to seek a new form of community. The 
reason is simple; more people find it difficult to depend solely on family bonds, as drastic 
change occurs in our structure of life” (p. 23). The increasing focus on community 
building, as Takenobu suggests, shows the internal and external impacts of a need to rely 
on family members that is shifting the attitudes of young adults to form communities 
rather than start families. On a different note, White (2002) points out that in the West, 
people delineate having children as “starting a family” while as in Japan, family is 
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constantly within an individual’s existence, even if it is merely through word of mouth in 
the form of stories and quips about the older generations who had passed (p. 99), 
highlighting that the constant presence of family in Japanese culture does not create the 
same want of having children as in the United States. Takenobu’s article heightens the 
value placed on bonds, but that “family bonds” and “community” are not “dependent on 
a simplistic view of the family structure: man as breadwinner and woman as unpaid 
laborer” (pp. 23-24), showing that it has become an impossible task to simply define the 
family and ie in the direction that Japanese families are embarking. However, the one 
commonality is that family creates a sense of security and stability that make one 
comfortable (Akaishi, Suda, Takenobu, & Motoyama, 2004), but that it is a lingering of 
the past need for certainty and fear of change. The historical view on ie by the 
aforementioned authors give excellent historical context, as well as heighten the changing 
landscape of ie in modern times. However, the lack of theory in the Japanese context of 
changing family formation and conceptualization show that there is much research left to 
be done in years to come to clearly define family in its changing habitat. 
3.2 Stigmas within Japanese Society 
As previously mentioned, social stigmas, though pervasive in sociological research, are 
very rarely the main topic of research within a particular society, but rather at a societal 
level in reference to disabilities or mental illnesses within the social psychology sphere. 
The lack of concrete research within a given society has led to numerous academic texts 
to speak about stigmas importantly in passing but have led to next to no texts purely on 
social stigmas and their definitions. In reference to Japan, stigmas are of especial 
importance due to the taboos that have been present as a reverberation of the family 
ideology, ie. As such, defining stigmas is of crucial importance and distinguishing it from 
taboos. Dovidio, Major, and Crocker (2000) define stigma as “a social construction, 
shaped by cultural and historical forces” and that stigmas are “determined by the broader 
cultural context (involving stereotype, values, and ideologies)” (p. 3). Similarly, Crocker 
and Quinn (2000) add that “the central feature of social stigma is devaluation and 
dehumanization by others” (p. 153), emphasizing that negative attributes are placed upon 
individuals who deviate from the majority. Taboos, on the other hand, are furthermore 
less written about in social sciences in the Japanese context but can be applied to stigmas 
as the social construct that is stigmatized. Taboo is defined as “the prohibition of an action 
based on the belief that such behavior is either too sacred and consecrated or too 
dangerous and accursed for ordinary individuals to undertake” (The Editors of 
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Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2016), meaning that the concept is based solely on the beliefs 
of a certain group of people and, thus, shows variances from culture to culture. In the 
Japanese context, taboos are less stressed as forbidden and more as “not discussed in 
principle” or historically not allowed, within the concept of family to include anything 
that deviate traditional views and attitudes away from the classic ie ideology to create a 
nontraditional model of family. These nontraditional family models include, but are not 
limited to, single parenthood, singleness, childlessness, and deviation from the salaryman 
and sengyou shufu model of a nuclear family as imbued by societal pressures and the 
Civil Code. Thus, for the purpose of this MA thesis, I will define stigma as a historically 
bound concept that creates societal prejudice and attaches negative attributes to the person 
as a result of societal taboos in the Japanese context. As little academic research exists on 
stigmas as an entity within Japanese society, I will instead propose a framework of the 
different aspects that I deem as stigmas as outlined by Japan Studies experts: single 
parenthood and illegitimacy. 
Single parenthood within Japan has been on the rise since industrialization but is still 
lower than other developed nations, at a steady 2.3 percent, while in countries like the 
United States, the rates are above 40 percent (Kumagai, 2014). These percentages show 
the differences in societal acceptance towards giving birth outside of wedlock, even 
between two highly developed nations. Kumagai (2014) hypothesizes that the low 
birthrates in Japan among single unmarried women “could be due to factors within 
Japanese society and culture” (p. 56) that are preventing more women to give birth outside 
the institution of marriage. 
Single parenthood may be by far the most stigmatized part of Japanese families in the 
modern era, because of the precarious nature of being able to afford being a single parent 
in a developed nation (Semuels, 2017). With majorly traditional viewpoints on having 
children, research by Choe et al (2014) illustrates that only 20 percent of participants 
perceive having children outside of marriage as acceptable with minimal change since 
2000 (p. 251), heightening the societal stigma towards accepting both single parenthood 
and illegitimacy while it is more acceptable for couples, both men and women, to be 
satisfied in life without children according to 33 percent of respondents (p. 250). These 
contradicting views by Japanese men and women demonstrate the dual nature of 
nontraditional attitudes that are furthering the stigmas within family. 
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As previously mentioned, Japan’s traditional family system is one of the pivotal reasons 
many are discouraged from “challenging the social norm” because of the fact that 
marriage is supposed to be based on a contract between a man and a woman. This contract 
between a man and a woman, though, has had another side to it in the historical context, 
that that contract allows for a child to not be illegitimate at birth. With illegitimacy come 
future issues for the child, because the transferal of the koseki4, or family registration, is 
necessary for children to be placed in schools and applying for government approved 
documents (White, 2002, p. 93), creating a stigma about single parenthood as well as 
illegitimate children and non-heteronormative relationships (Kumagai, 2008), even 
though they are not as rare within society as previous decades (Akaishi et al, 2004). 
Sugimoto (1997) explores the issue of illegitimacy as a consequence of the traditional ie 
ideology, emphasizing the concept of koseki as a part of the patriarchal design of the Civil 
Code. As mentioned, the koseki establishes a household register with the husband as the 
head of household, connecting family members with a common surname, so children born 
out of wedlock have less advantages within society if they are not a part of their father’s 
register.  
Sugimoto emphasizes that with the koseki comes the derived seki, which is the “view that, 
unless one is formally registered as belonging to an organization or institution, one has 
no proper station in society” (p. 141), bringing a distressing issue for every aspect of life 
in Japan. The seki can thus be applied to school with the gakuseki, or school registry, to 
even the death registry, kiseki. These registers create a “cause for anxiety” (p. 142), 
because of the denial of being able to be a part of the koseki for illegitimate children, what 
with the seki dictating much of the ability to choose one’s own path in family forming. 
Furthermore, under the Civil Code, children born out of wed-lock were not entitled to the 
same inheritance privileges as siblings who are born to wed parents, with only the right 
to claim half of what the other siblings are eligible to inherit (Sugimoto, 1997; Yuki, 
2013), showing a clear stigmatization towards children born out of wedlock and parents 
who have children before marriage. Children birthed outside of wedlock is estimated at 
2.3 percent, considerably lower than other countries, but illegitimacy is stigmatized more 
so in Japan than in the US or Europe for example. Additionally, Kumagai suggests that 
the discrimination towards illegitimate children to not be able to have similar inheritance 
privileges could have an impact on the low birthrates to single women. However, these 
                                               
4  The family registration system was disbanded in 1976 after years of discrimination towards the burakumin, or former outcast society members (White, 2002). 
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discriminatory laws were repealed in 2013, making illegitimacy less controversial for 
inheritance purposes (p. 56). Furthermore, Kumagai states that “the traditional ie system 
is still operating underneath the Japanese psyche, discouraging births out of wedlock” (p. 
57) and encouraging that marriage is between a man and a woman in which a common-
law marriage is not acceptable, heightening the stigma towards having children away 
from these traditional boundaries of ie. 
Stigmatized individuals in Japan hold an oppressed connotation that is creating an image 
that being a single parent or illegitimate is viewed as a “pity” by others, which is a 
negative attribute being applied to the concept of family.  
3.3 Individual Collectivism as a Downfall for Family Formation 
As a periodically collective state, Japan has abided by the constitutionality of Kokutai 
principles of the Meiji Constitution that focused on the Emperor and the idea of Japanese 
society being made of a community adhered to as “one family” under the Emperor 
beseeching the destruction of any notion towards individualism and individuality among 
the ie5 as a way to try to steer clear of Western ideologies and obey the Emperor as the 
Head of State and the household prior to the 1947 Constitution (Goodman C. F., 2017, 
pp. 34-38). However, the concept of Kokutai can only loosely be applied to Japan today, 
since it is only a remnant of the past. Furthermore, Sugimoto (1997) describes Japan as a 
country with “friendly authoritarianism” as a way for the “deterrence of deviant 
behavior…to comply with the expected norms and standards” (p. 245) as dictated by the 
society at large. As such, the society adheres to the concept of collective responsibility, 
rentai sekinin, for any misconduct by the members of the group. This conceptualization 
of the Japanese State as collective has led to predominantly so-called ordinary attitudes 
and, thus, stigmatized nontraditional family ideals held by the Western influenced youth 
and young adults who will become the parents of tomorrow in Japan. With an up-spike 
in education centered pathways, nontraditional family ideals are becoming increasingly 
evident within the attitudes of students and career centered individuals. 
As the focus of my research centers around the future of family formation and family 
ideals, it is essential to understand the possible future generation of parents’, i.e. the young 
adults’ and adolescents in Japanese society’s, viewpoint and rearing in a collectivist 
                                               
5 Ie is used in a different romanization of iye in Carl F. Goodman’s 2017 article, Contemplated Amendments 
to Japan’s 1947: A Return to Iye, Kokutai and the Meiji State, but does not differentiate the definition nor terminology, only the spelling and romanization in the source text. 
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society, particularly those on the path of education who will begin rearing their own 
children in five to fifteen years’ time. As aforesaid, Japan has been societally collectivist 
for centuries where individual desires were tamped down in order to favor the 
considerations of the community as a whole, however, Japanese youth are becoming more 
individualistic in values, and are now leaning towards a value system centered around 
“individualistic collectivism” (Sugimura & Mizokami, 2013) where individuals look out 
for themselves, while still being willing to work towards the common goal towards 
society’s favor. Matsumoto (2002) coins this predicament where the youth are more 
individualistic in nature than their parents and grandparents who still value higher 
collectivistic tendencies, as “IC6 duality” (p. 101). This has been evident in the changes 
from school-to-work formula to a school-to-university-to-career formula, thus, making it 
so that adolescents begin to think about their futures earlier than their parents and 
grandparents (Sugimura & Mizokami, 2013, p. 135), which can be seen for other 
developed nations as well. These changing ideals and life parameters are, hence, pushing 
marriage and children until much later on. The struggle between “individualism” and 
“collectivism” is seen through the want of young adults to have children, but through the 
entrance into the workforce, it becomes clear that it is much harder to give up on a career 
path for a childrearing path without high intrinsic needs for wanting children, because of 
the increasing opportunity cost associated with marriage and childrearing, while the costs 
of staying single and childless are falling (Schoppa, 2006, p. 68).  
The fulfillment of individual desires prior to the newly conceptualized “individualistic 
collectivism” in the past two decades is seen through the popular concept of “parasite 
singles” coined by Yamada Masahiro, which, in essence, is used to describe young adults 
and adults still living with their parents while working, with no need to pay for housing, 
and spending their income on luxury goods, travel, and nights out (Schoppa, 2006, pp. 
77-78). These “parasite singles” are a prime example of Matsumoto’s concept of “IC 
duality” in that with the decrease in functional population replacement, there are more 
resources available for the youth and young adults, decreasing their desire for having 
children or even living on their own. According to Matsumoto, with increases in resource 
availability and decrease birthrates, these combined “lead to an inevitable decrease in 
collectivistic behaviors, values and group consciousness” and, thus, led to an increase in 
“individuality, uniqueness, and separateness” (Matsumoto, 2002, p. 107) that are having 
                                               
6 IC is an acronym for “individualism vs collectivism” and is used by Matsumoto et al (1996) to describe a world with both individualistic and collectivist tendencies present as aspects of a societal culture.  
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an undue reaction in birthrates and fertility by young adults who are choosing to wait until 
later to get married and have children, if even doing either in the long run. As Sugimoto 
explains, Japanese society is stuck “between collective integration and individual dignity” 
(p. 258) in terms of moving towards the changes taking shape in recent years. 
Triandis (2001) stresses that in “collectivist cultures, child rearing emphasizes 
conformity, obedience, security, and reliability; in individualist cultures, child rearing 
emphasizes independence, exploration, creativity, and self-reliance” (p. 912) and 
differentiates the two as separate entities in the sciences, while as Matsumoto (2002) 
synthesizes the separate entities in describing Japanese society particularly with the 
prevalence of collectivist ideologies historically and the continually changing values 
towards individualism by Japanese youth as the aforesaid “IC duality”, however, in 
referring to Matsumoto’s research, Sugimura and Mizokami combine the terms as 
“individualistic collectivism”, with Matsumoto not referencing the term in his works, 
though being given the credit for the conceptualization. With the terms forged into one, 
individualistic collectivism and IC duality give synchronicity to the wave that is making 
its way through Japanese society as individuals, particularly the youth and young adults, 
are beginning to look out more for themselves, but still holding fast towards familial and 
societal obligations and bonds that bound their parents and grandparents during the 20th 
century’s economic boom and later stagnancy.  
Research by Sugimura and Mizokami (2013) differs slightly from an aforementioned 
interview I conducted with a female Japanese language instructor in March 2018 but is 
evidenced as individualistic tendencies by Matsumoto et al (1996), Matsumoto (2002), 
and Triandis (2001). Through conversations with her, it became apparent to me that 
though she is a career centered woman in the workforce who wants to remain in the 
workforce for years to come, her intrinsic wants for having children will not be swayed 
by her desire for a career or helping Japanese society in a collective manner by helping 
increase the population. The respondent’s answers towards questions regarding the 
decreasing fertility in Japan matched the majority of answers in a 2009 Declining 
Birthrate White Paper by the Government of Japan where nearly half of the respondents 
(49.9%) voiced that the decreasing fertility is “very dangerous” and 33.1% that it is “more 
or less dangerous” (Winter & Teitenlbaum, 2013, p. 198), showing an understanding 
towards the dilemmas Japan is facing, but little incentive towards acting upon the societal 
pressures. In continuing, the respondent, when further asked whether Japan’s current 
situation would impact her decision to have children, she was adamant that it is through 
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purely her selfish wants of having children, even if she feels that the path Japan’s 
population is heading in is “not very good,” because it has been her dream to have her 
own family with a husband and two children, and maybe even pets, since she was a little 
girl (Anonymous, 2018). The interview begs the questions for whether family formation 
schemes to increase fertility rates can only occur with genuine want for having children 
or Japan’s current status little impact on the decisions and whether the future generation 
will lack the basic desires for children through family formation and, in the end, having 
a detrimental impact on family formation.   
3.4 Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis as a Vicious Circle for 
Nontraditional Family Ideals 
Going along with a similar theme as the previous subchapter, this subchapter will focus 
on attitudinal changes for childbearing and rearing through the approach of the Low-
Fertility Trap Hypothesis (LFTH) formulated by Lutz, Skirbekk, and Testa (2006). The 
LFTH can be seen as an alternative towards the low-fertility issue during a time when 
there are next to no usable theories on when, if or how fertility will rise in the aftermath 
of dangerously low TFR projections. Though the LFTH is written and researched for the 
European context, this pseudo-theory can be applied to Japan with its unique goal of 
creating a conduit towards future discussions on governmental interference on fertility 
related issues when the TFR is below 1.5. Low-fertility is impacting Japan at a much 
faster rate than any other developed nation with the widening gap between the mortality 
age and birth and the top-heavy ageing society. As such, the LFTH and other research 
similar to it can be likewise used to dissect Japan’s fertility crisis and the changing 
attitudes towards family formation as a framework. 
The essence of the Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis is that the current generation of future 
parents have been socialized to think that it is acceptable for them to have few to no 
children at all, due to their parents and elders having fewer children than their earlier 
counterparts (Lutz, Skirbekk, & Testa, 2006). This perception is well-matched to the 
study on nontraditional family attitudes at the macro and micro levels by Choe et al (2014)  
that also include that furthering one’s education and pushing childbearing until later 
results in the social acceptance of dedicating time to careers, rather than family formation. 
The hypothesis assists in putting the need to say one wants to have children into 
perspective, but that to do exactly that could be driven only by intrinsic thoughts rather 
than a deep-rooted societal pressure imbued by the previous generations. Though the 
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hypothesis presented in the 2006 research paper establishes a basis for low birthrates in 
Europe, the same principles can be transferred to the case of Japan, since Japan is having 
accelerated issues in terms of decreasing population replacement way beyond those of the 
levels witnessed in Europe. Lutz et al (2006) rationalize the discussion of lowering 
birthrates on whether governments should interfere in their country’s population crisis or 
leave it entirely up to the general populace to maintain at their own discretion, but the 
authors do not necessarily believe that, when considering all aspects of their research, that 
fertility will continue to decline (Lutz, Skirbekk, & Testa, 2006, p. 168). In culmination 
with their research, the results argue towards a pessimistic viewpoint for the future parents 
being able to right the rapidly declining birthrates, that the issues will only persist in 
coming years as the acceptance of fewer children becomes more widespread and 
commonplace.  
Lutz et al (2006) illustrate their hypothesis via a representative chart with three separate 
aspects of the hypothesis: population dynamics, sociological reasoning, and economic 
rationale, each emphasizing the three aspects they believe to be the main driving forces 
in attitudinal change in terms of population decline. For the purpose of framing this MA 
thesis, focus will be applied to LFT-2, sociological reasoning, but that LFT as a whole 
creates a symphonized understanding of the fertility issues in a societal construction. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that LFT-1, population dynamics, depicts the issue that 
fewer births today will result in fewer potential parents in the future generation of fertility 
cohorts and LFT-3, economic rationale, creates the hypothesis that an amplified need for 
consumption will increase the comparable expectations for future income; therefore, 
bringing a lower future fertility as a vicious circle for Japan’s population projections in 
coming years. 
Sociological reasoning as the basis for changing attitudes towards lower fertility and ideal 
family size in LFT-2 demonstrate that with the normalization of witnessing fewer children 
within age cohort groups and in passing throughout one’s formative years, will result in 
smaller personal ideal family structures by the potential future fertility cohort. Simply, as 
young adults witness smaller families within their communities, such as parents with one 
to few children, or no children at all, they will normalize the idea that it is acceptable to 
have fewer or even no children in the future. Societal acceptance of fewer children will 
eventually translate to marrying or not marrying as less stigmatized, creating an unnatural 
declining population for the future as attitudes are changing. This vicious circle creates 
issues in the fertility decline issue that is “triggered by declines in actual fertility” from 
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recent history (Lutz, Skirbekk, & Testa, 2006, pp. 175-6). Furthermore, as ideals for 
family size and structure continue to shift, the possibility remains for fertility increase as 
well as decline, but only the societal attitudinal changes in aspirations and ideals versus 
reality can correct further decline.  
Figure 1: Low-Fertility trap Hypothesis (LFT-1-3) 
 
Source: Model representing the Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis as the “demographic (LFT-1), sociological (LFT-2) and economic (LFT-3)” to give a visual representation of the research. The figure was taken from the original publication: Lutz, W., Skirbekk, V., and Testa M. R. (2006). 
Through my fieldwork, I came to an alarming epiphanic thought: maybe the problem is 
not the incentives that the government brings, but perhaps the intrinsic motivation of 
today’s youth to not have children at all. Through my research subsequent to my 
fieldwork, I stumbled across the aforesaid “low-fertility trap” hypothesis by Lutz, 
Skirbekk, and Testa (2006) that matched my findings prior to analyzing and discussing 
the issues of low fertility and declining household sizes to a certain degree, in that the 
current generation of potential future parents have been socialized to think that it is 
acceptable for them to have few to no children at all, due to their parents having fewer 
children (Choe, Bumpass and Tsuya). The theory helps put into perspective the need to 
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want to say one wants to have children, as many responded in such a manner in the 
questionnaires, but that to do exactly that could be driven only by intrinsic thoughts rather 
than a deep-rooted societal pressure imbued by the previous generations. Though the 
hypothesis presented in the 2006 research paper establishes a basis for low birthrates in 
Europe, the same principles can be transferred to the case of Japan, since Japan is having 
accelerated issues in terms of decreasing population replacement. The main contribution 
of the paper is to rationalize the discussion of lowering birthrates on whether governments 
should interfere in their country’s population crisis or leave it entirely up to the general 
populace to maintain at their own discretion, but the authors do not necessarily believe 
that, when considering all aspects of their research, that fertility will continue to decline 
(Lutz, Skirbekk, & Testa, 2006, p. 168). 
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
As the definition of ie is constantly changing and adapting to the newly “modern” world, 
stigmas are emerging as remnants of the historical Japanese family structure as the 
attitudes of the possible parents of tomorrow are evolving beyond those of traditional 
norms. With the Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis by Lutz et al (2006) and individual 
collectivism/IC duality as distinguished by Matsumoto (2002) and Sugimura and 
Mizokami (2013) as frames for understanding the changing attitudes towards family 
formation and childbearing tendencies by potential future parents, a solid understanding 
is applied to the fertility issues plaguing Japan. Now that I have laid out the conceptual 
framework in reference to the changing attitudes on Japanese family, from the definition 
and meaning of family to defining and expressing the stigmas present within Japanese 
family and society in general to the individual collectivism taking shape amongst young 
adults to finally the Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis, I will now move towards the 
methodology chapter to further discuss my methods for studying Japanese families and 
the changing attitudes for family formation as well as prepare the thesis for the analysis 
chapter following the methodology.  
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4.  Methodology: Research Approach and Data Acquisition 
Researching the ideals and attitudes of the next generation of parents, today’s university 
students, will provide an understanding of the needs and wants of university students for 
their families and provide further comprehension towards young adults’ understanding of 
family and family-related issues. It has become apparent that with people focusing on 
their educations and careers, families are continuously decreasing in numbers per 
household, and people are becoming less enthused about having children with their 
already busy lives. White (2002) stresses the resilience of the Confucian ie in that the 
family becomes an extension of the nation, that prospering within the household benefits 
the nation as a whole, which has been evident in the changes from the school-to-work 
formula to the school-to-university-to-career formula, thus, making it so that adolescents 
begin to think about their futures earlier than their parents and grandparents (Sugimura & 
Mizokami, 2013, p. 135); hence, pushing marriage and children until much later on in 
life.  As such, the following chapter will detail the methodology behind my research on 
the attitudes toward family-related issues and on family in general by university students, 
such as the qualitative research approach for analysis and discussion, justification and 
methodology for using surveys and group discussions versus expert-or otherwise-
interviews in gathering data and will briefly detail other aspects of the research process.  
4.1 Approach to Research and Questions for Data Acquisition 
As the focus of my research centers around the ideals and attitudes toward family 
formation by current university students, it is essential to understand the future generation 
of parents, i.e. the young adults in Japanese society, particularly those on the path of 
education; hence, I have chosen to pursue qualitative research approaches for studying 
changing family ideals. Focusing on the future parents who are currently pursuing 
educational paths in metropolitan areas, such as the Tokyo region to name one, will shed 
light on the target population that whose age and economic cohorts tend to value families 
differently than their counterparts in rural settings. Choe, Bumpass, Tsuya, and Rindfuss 
(2014) emphasize that those individuals with higher educational upbringings and levels 
will have non-traditionalistic attitudes towards family. They also accentuate that 
relationships are a compilation of “kin ties, neighborhoods, the workplace, and 
friendships” (Choe, Bumpass, Tsuya, & Rindfuss, June 2014, p. 242), meaning that 
backgrounds enter into a large part of the attitudinal shifts towards family formation. As 
Maxwell (2005) emphasizes that the qualitative approach is particularly good for research 
where the objective is to understand “context within which the participants act, and the 
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influence” of the said actions for a relatively small sample size, rather than a large sample 
(p. 22). Maxwell additionally heightens that qualitative methods will, thus, “preserve the 
individuality” of each participant’s participation, adding to the later analysis.  
Japanese youth are becoming more individualistic in values and attitudes after periods of 
stressed collectivism and are now leaning towards a value system centered around 
“individualistic collectivism” (Sugimura & Mizokami, 2013) where individuals look out 
for themselves and their best interest, while still being willing to work for the common 
goal of improving society. This has been evident in the changes from aforementioned 
school-to-work formula to a school-to-university-to-career formula, thus, making it so 
that adolescents begin to think about their futures earlier than their parents and 
grandparents (Sugimura & Mizokami, 2013: 135), hence pushing marriage and children 
until much later in life, or never at all. The struggle between “individualism” and 
“collectivism” is seen through the want of young adults to have children, but through the 
withdrawal from educational institutions to the entrance into the workforce, it becomes 
clear that it is much harder to give up on a career path for a childrearing path without high 
intrinsic needs for wanting children, making the issue of having children dependent on 
the wants of individuals as well as the ability to economically sustain a family in the long 
term.  
For my research and methodology, a focus on the school-to-university-to-career formula 
is essential in understanding why the educated adults are not choosing to have children. 
Thus, I plan to pursue two forms of data acquisition to research the family ideals 
university students have. First, I created, translated, and distributed a questionnaire survey 
geared towards Japanese university students using the snowball distribution method as a 
way to randomize the students who answer the questionnaires and gives equal chances of 
receiving answers from male and female students. The alternatively called snowball 
sampling method is an excellent method for having participants and contacts distribute 
the survey to those whom they deem to fit the needed criteria (May, 2011). Choosing to 
conduct survey research derives from the lack of financial resources for conducting 
interviews in Japan as well as the time constraints. Survey research, however, is a 
common methodology in social sciences, particularly in sociology, towards which this 
thesis leans toward. Sociologist Robert J. Franzese, P.h.D. (2009) emphasizes that survey 
research has been made of particular importance through the efforts of sociologists, and 
the “successes[…]with the survey method have spilled over to other fields” (p. 15) over 
the last century. Survey methods are particularly good for conducting research on 
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deviance, which, as an umbrella topic, includes stigmas and taboos as well, fitting 
perfectly for the small niche within my research. Secondly, I organized an informal 
discussion with university students at Senshu University in October 2018 through a 
university contact. The discussion ended up with eight participants, who were 
surprisingly evenly distributed with the male to female ratio with an age range from 22-
30. The combination of distributed questionnaires and a discussion with potential future 
parents gave insight into the internal and external wants and needs of the young adults of 
Japan, so that further analysis can be done to understand the mindset of Japan’s potential 
future parents.  
The questions used for the questionnaire survey took the route of asking about what the 
ideal family is from the stand point of the cohort that might have values and attitudes of 
nontraditional families from extensive educational backgrounds, but used standardized, 
nonleading questions to help guide the students to describe their current and ideal 
families. To be precise, the questionnaires consist of questions relating to family, family 
demographics, ideologies, what Japanese students want in a family, and what government 
implementations they would find more enticing for starting a family, or if there is 
anything that could change their minds into having kids if they do not want to have kids. 
The questionnaire is not similar in style to the International Social Survey Programme 
surveys with a range of questions with a scale of strongly agree to strongly disagree, but 
rather consists of open ended questions that provide more qualitative responses for future 
analysis. I chose to refrain from using the ISSP survey style for the fact that, from the 
research viewpoint of Japanese Studies, many of the participants tend to be in the neutral 
category, therefore, creating the potential for inaccurate data and inability to analyze. The 
open-ended questions, on the other hand, comprise majorly on family ideology and 
personal beliefs on ideal households, desire for marriage and children, work-life balance 
as well as viewpoints on single parenthood, as single parenthood is a small niche case I 
analyze further as stigmatized in Japanese society.  
The main questions I focused on are the stigmas that are present in Japanese society, such 
as single parenthood and illegitimacy, and, thus, stigmatized characteristic towards 
preventing successful family formation and family inclusiveness in society. With the 
current state that Japan’s fertility crisis is in, a focus directed at the future childrearing 
generation and assisting in shifting the ever-present stigmas, but the implementations of 
the government lack in researching and implementing ways to further incentivize career-
oriented individuals to have children and allow single parents to be accepted in society. 
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Other questions I research deal with how family formation is currently failing with the 
increased attention the government is putting on making it easier for parents to take time 
off to care for their children. These questions are by no means fully answered through 
this research project, but the topic is brought to light to increase awareness of the areas 
that are lacking emphasis and research in the previous chapters. 
4.2 Data Acquisition Procedures in the Field 
Japan is seeking to ensure the possibility of a positive and prosperous future through the 
reinforcement of family planning practices geared towards the ideals of the next 
generation of parents. In recent years, the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare has 
created incentive programs to lessen the burden of having children, but according to the 
most recent data compilation released in April 2018, Tokyo has the lowest fertility rates 
as of 2016 in Japan (Vital, Health and Social Statistics Office, 2018), making the root 
cause of the low fertility in the capitol region questionable even with the corporate 
incentive programs that should attract businessmen and women alike to have more 
children. According to population projections, the current course of Japan’s fertility crisis 
will send Japan’s population to between 88.08 million and 94.90 million by 2065, 
depending on the low or high projections released for the 2017 population index (National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2018). These projections are 
staggering for the Japanese workforce and officials with the impossible task ahead of 
maintaining Japan’s economy and future. Thus, it is imperative to investigate ways to 
make it easier and more reasonable for the future generations of Japanese parents to have 
options and incentives that will fit their ways of life, and not the lives of the parents of 
today nor yesterday, to increase these projections to stability for an economically better 
future. However, could there be a more pressing need that has to be addressed, away from 
giving further incentives and programs to the next generation of parents, that would 
explain the continually dropping numbers of children being born?  
Through the use of a questionnaire geared towards the potential future parents in Japan 
on the path to education and vis-à-vis those wishing to then push creating families until 
later in life, I hope to contribute qualitative data on opinions and attitudes towards 
families, children, marriage, and the stigmas associated with families, to create a holistic 
perspective on changing family attitudes. The questionnaire began distribution in July 
2018 through university contacts in Tokyo and the associated fieldwork was conducted 
in October 2018 during my fieldwork trip partially funded through the CEAS Travel 
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Grant. 
 
4.2.1 Locating Fieldwork Sites and Informal Discussions with 
Potential Future Parents 
Preparations into working in the field in Japan began in September 2018 through booking 
flights and finding accommodations, the general logistics of fieldwork in itself. A month 
prior to departure, I contacted organizations in Japan that dealt with family planning and 
policy implementation, or the statistics that are essential for my research. Some of these 
organizations included the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, the National Institute 
of Population and Social Security Research, the Office for the Promotion of Overcoming 
Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy in Japan, and the WAKUWAKU 
Network. Unfortunately, the only response received was from the National Institute of 
Population and Social Security Research (IPSS), in which they referred me to the Cabinet 
Office of Japan after consulting their fertility experts. The Cabinet Office of Japan, after 
further research and inquiry, did not come out to anything feasible since the Office for 
the Promotion of Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy in Japan 
did not respond either.  
The lack of responses created justifiable worries and anxieties not foreseen for the 
fieldwork and readjustments were necessary in methods for gathering data. A chapter in 
Doing Fieldwork in Japan gave the idea of showing up to an organization without prior 
notice, with the author Ian Reader praising his method of doing fieldwork as an “effective 
fieldwork strategy” for many reasons, with one being that coming unannounced prevents 
prior preparation on the organization’s end and, thus, is “unable to utilize avoidance 
tactics” (Reader 93), bringing the research into an entirely new realm of ideas. However, 
after consulting with others, doing unannounced visits to ministries and government 
sector organizations, the plan seemed less feasible in all actuallity, due to the security 
aspect of these offices and needing prior clearance in entering. As such, the only place 
available to visit was the WAKUWAKU Network located in Toshima Ward, near 
Ikebukuro.  
The WAKUWAKU Network 7  is a nonprofit organization dedicated to providing 
assistance to single parents and low-income households through children’s cafeterias at 
little to no cost to parents (Mainichi Japan, 2018). However, the WAKUWAKU Network 
                                               
7 Also referred to as Toshima Kodomo WAKUWAKU Hoikuen 
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does much more than offter kodomo shokudo, or children’s cafeterias, two times a month. 
Through funds provided by the MHLW and other state and private sponsorships, the 
network is able to provide daycare services, elderly assistance, and create a “sense of 
family and home” (Suzuki, 2018) that the children might not otherwise be able to 
experience. During the visit, I conducted an improptu interview with the curator with the 
help of fellow MA student, Yejee Choi. Further information about the visit can be found 
in the annex section of this thesis.  
Another part of fieldwork in Tokyo that provided valuable information was an 
opportunity given by Ben Norton, an International Coordinator and English Language 
Teacher at Senshu University and fellow alum of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 
Through Norton’s assistance and coordination, I was able to have a 30 minute informal 
discussion with his eight advanced level English language students about Japanese 
fertility and learn about their perspectives on children and parenthood. Conducting a 
group discussion in addition to surveys gives more opportunities for investigating the 
norms and dynamics within the decided target cohort (May, 2011, pp. 137-8). May (2011) 
emphasizes that group interviews provide invaluable information when conducted in a 
controlled manner and facilitated properly by the person leading the discussion. 
Conducting the group discussion in the students’ familiar classroom at Senshu created a 
sense of ease for the students, where they were used to using the English language and 
having discussion, making it the best place to conduct the discussion to gather the utmost 
data from the group. Additionally, group discussions provide further opportunities for 
qualitiative data acquisition through the comparison of responses between survey data 
and interview data from similar cohort groups. However, May heightens the importance 
of being mindful to the fact that group discussions may produce differing perspectvies to 
the survey data due to the interaction of the group discussion participants that may enable 
a different path in discussion that independent thought during survey response.   
4.2.2 Questionnaire and Distribution 
The idea to send a questionnaire to Japanese students in university through the assistance 
of a university contact in Tokyo came into play after thinking about the logistics 
surrounding the research period. Overall, the idea to do a questionnaire over interviews 
works better in the context of family, since the students are then able to anonymously 
provide details of their families and future ideals, while conducting interviews could have 
prevented honest answers from forming when revealing family details to a stranger. The 
increased anonymity proved to be fruitful in the responses given, since the respondents 
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were not shy in responding fully to the questions given. Additionally, in the sociology 
realm, surveys have become an important tool for revealing information, with Franzese 
(2009) hailing it as a perfected tool in the study of sociology. Revealing information on 
topics such as family and potential stigmas associated within the realm of family 
definitely require a research tool that give opportunities for digging underneath the 
surface to gain a full understanding of the attitudes of potential future parents in the topic 
of families and family ideals. According to May (2011), surveys can be used to gather 
data on attitudes in particular, such as “what people think about life in general and events 
in particular” (p. 95) and can also gauge aspirations, such as ideals in this research 
project’s case.  
The questionnaire I distributed stems from the research this thesis topic has developed 
into inquiring about personal ideals in family-related situations, such as household size, 
marriage and children. The questionnaire also ended up including certain stigmas, such 
as the viewpoints university students have towards single parenthood and adoption. 
However, much to my chagrin, defining “stigmas” to the students proved more 
challenging due to the aforementioned confusion in terminology and definition. 
Incorporating multiple aspects of family into to the questionnaire took approximately four 
weeks between development in English and then translating using proper Japanese 
ankeeto terminology 8  and preventing the questions from leading the respondent’s 
answers. The final version consists of approximately 25 questions, aside from the general 
demographic questions, and helps provide an overview on family ideals, family 
household size and the education levels of their parents, views on nontraditional families 
and whether the respondent thinks that they will be able to have their ideal families in the 
future. 
Ben Norton assisted in distributing the questionnaire amongst his students, as well as his 
colleagues’ students at Senshu university during my time in Japan, with soft dispersal 
with the snowball distribution method. After dispersal, five to seven responses by 
September ended up at 23 responses, with expected results ending at maximum ten, that 
have given insight into the future of Japanese families and show a wide variety of ages, 
genders and perspectives than initially expected.  
                                               
8 Translations were done with the assistance of Ms. Yejee Choi, fellow CEAS MA student, and Ms. Ayano 
Nagata, former CEAS Japanese teacher. Initial English questions were first translated with Ms. Choi’s assistance and final translations and corrections by Ms. Nagata. 
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4.3 Overview of Data and Methods for Analyzing Data  
For the analysis chapter I will use qualitative analysis techniques to dichotomize the 
problem of declining fertility and attitudinal changes towards family formation by 
Japanese university students, and the potential stigmatization of Japanese families as a 
result.  
The questionnaire received 23 responses from university students in Japan and were 
gathered July to October 2018. The age range for the respondents is 18 to 30 years of age, 
with the majority of the respondents between the ages of 19 and 21. Of the 23 respondents, 
17 were female and six were male, making it disproportionate in terms of getting an equal 
or true representation of the views of university students in comparison to actual numbers 
of male-to-female students in university in Japan. Male students significantly outweigh 
the numbers of female students, with 1,627 male students to 1,264 female students in 
universities across Japan (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, Japan, 2018), showing the opposite representation that my 
questionnaire gained.  
For analyzing the data, I systematically grazed the data I received by converting the 
questionnaire responses into a well-organized excel document that contains all the 
responses for easy access and cross referencing. For coding methods, I decided to use 
deductive coding, and categorizing my data into sections of similar questions helped to 
create themes, such as household types in the ideal family scenario, want for having 
children and getting married, family-related stigmas, etc. I compiled these similar 
questions into groups and within those groups found similarities in responses that allowed 
me to further analyze the data and find patterns that would give insight into the issues at 
hand. For example, in terms of family ideals, I took the questions “What kind of family 
do you want to have in the future? What is the ideal family for you?” and “What kind of 
family is the ideal Japanese family? Is it similar to your ideal future family?” and 
compared the answers within the two columns to see how the responses differed, and then 
cross-referenced responses to their demographic information, such as age and the 
household type from their childhood, to see how they connect with their future ideals. 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) suggest that asking further questions during the analysis stage 
of research allows the researcher to probe, develop provisional answers, think outside the 
box, and become acquainted with the data, which allow the researcher to delve deeper 
into and within the data, rather than only scratch at it on the surface level. I found that 
coding the data in this manner by hand made it easier for me rather than using a coding 
platform. I decided to steer away from using coding software and tools, such as NVivo, 
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because analyzing the data is the role of the researcher and a data analysis software would 
only compute the data to be handled easier, but for me, dealing with the data on my own 
works better that computing it through software. To create a better visual, I also color 
coded the genders, purple for women and blue for men, to better understand the 
viewpoints of the respondents as well as easily make deductions from the responses 
without referencing back to the gender all the time.  
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5.  Analysis 
The following chapter contains the data analysis and research results on attitudes toward 
family by university students and will be outlined with in the following. The first 
subchapter will highlight the responses towards the meaning of family from the viewpoint 
of the university students and will be followed by a close examination of the preference 
toward household types as an ideal family format. These two subchapters go into detail 
about the perception of family and the ideals that university students hold to get an 
understanding of patterns in the household types from growing up to then the potentially 
desired household in the future. Additionally, the third and fourth subchapters examine 
the desire for children and marriage as well as the necessity of children within a marriage 
from the perspective of university students. Alternatively from the previous themes, the 
fifth subchapter will study the responses toward the issue of declining birthrates to receive 
an understanding of the demographic situation to see how students view the issue or 
whether there is an issue with the demographic declines, while the sixth subchapter will 
look at stigmas within Japanese families from the perspective of Japanese university 
students to gather information on whether there are clear indicators for stigmatization 
within Japanese families as remnants of the ie ideology to further develop an 
understanding of the view towards an ability to achieve the ideal family in the future. The 
responses to the questionnaire and group discussion assist in answering the research 
question and family-related issues that will be further explored in the discussion chapter 
that is forthcoming.  
The concept of family is an intricate topic that needs finesse to dissect and analyze. As 
such, asking university students about their ideas about family needs an approach that 
requires some forethought and preparation. A finely picked questionnaire and discussion 
questions can produce honest answers from young adults on their path to education, or 
unintentionally sidetrack their answers towards the researched hypothesis with leading 
questions. As such, the following subchapters are the production of a structured 
questionnaire that gives insight into the attitudes university students have on family 
formation and what the ideal Japanese family is, if there is one in existence. 
5.1 The Meaning of Family 
A major component of family is the perception one has of their family as they age and 
the meaning they instill onto their understanding of family from childhood to adulthood. 
Thus, understanding the meaning university students imbue onto their view on family is 
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important for the comprehension of university students’ attitudes towards the increasing 
fertility crisis and changing family ideals. Commonalities among the respondents showed 
that their families bring the connotations of love, support, understanding, an absolute 
importance, and fun memories. These connotations conjure images of childhood 
memories and meals together at the dinner table, and “casual conversation in everyday 
life” (Tsuchiya, age 23) to help formulate the meaning of family from the perspectives of 
the university student respondents.  
Of the 23 respondents, four mentioned that the meaning of family is the entity that 
understands them the best, making family an immensely important part of the students’ 
lives. Understanding is seen as the most important aspect of family with views toward 
family as an objective being greater than oneself without romanticized opinions: 
“People who understand me more than myself. A family that sees me objectively, 
who know me more than I know myself” (Koshiishi, age 20), 
showing that there is deeper meaning towards family than just frivolous emotions. 
Additionally, family is seen as a solid entity that will remain because of the trust that 
understanding brings and the understanding that one will not stray in times of trouble:  
“A partner who can speak without suffering. Trusting that you will not be 
disliked” (Rio, age 21), 
heightening the need for absolute acceptance by family members. These emotions 
attached to the concept of family show the increasing value placed by students onto their 
connotation and interpretation of family. The concepts of love and happiness can be seen 
as an extension of understanding and acceptance as well, as a female 21 year old 
university student highlights that family incorporates love with individuality, but that 
family is able to have acceptance even during times of disagreement. 
Nami: “I feel that there is love. While each has individuality, I think that it is a 
good family that makes concessions while arguing”. 
The respondent’s conceptualization of family provides a deeper understanding of family, 
with the emphasis on being true to oneself as well as accepting the other members of the 
family at the same time because of the presence of love within the household.  
Individuality is also mentioned in another response and brings the concept of mutual 
respect in to the equation of family: 
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Ayaka, age 22: “A family that can be respected and respected independently by 
each individual”. 
An increased importance placed upon family away from the concept of romantic love is 
also mentioned within the responses. A female respondent mentioned that “’having a 
family’ has a serious meaning, a little more than that it is not just an extension of romance” 
(Nami, age 21), highlighting the importance of family beyond the romantic sense of love, 
accentuating the meaning of family towards the future. Further evidence was witnessed 
through responses that deal with “fun memories” and childhood memories. The 
connotation that is left with these responses points towards a further importance being 
placed on family as well as the past, making it apparent that family is still as relevant 
today as it was in the past, but also that family is changing constantly, though at a slow 
pace, much like memories and time.  
When thinking about family, many students showed differing attitudes, particularly if 
they have divorced parents or live within a single parent household. The absence of a 
parental figure, however, did not lessen the impact family has on the individual. For 
example, 21 year-old Mina referenced her family as divorced, but that even though her 
family is split up and now living apart, her siblings helped create an air of livelihood 
within the household growing up, making it so that she is happy to see her family no 
matter how long they go without seeing each other, adding to the importance of the 
emotion that family holds in her view:  
“My parents are divorced, but since I have three brothers, I think that it was a 
lively and busy family when I was young. My brothers live by themselves, so I 
cannot meet them every day, but I try to meet them regularly. No matter when we 
meet, I am happy to see my family” (Mina, age 21). 
The mention of siblings as the first thing that comes to mind was also mentioned by 
Natsuki, age 20, since she has 6 siblings who are taken care of by their single mother. She 
mentioned that when she thinks of family, the thing that comes to mind is “the face of 
everyone the most. I hope everyone is happy!”, accentuating the shared vision of 
happiness when thinking about family.  
One respondent stood out from the rest, in that they mentioned being able to return to 
family at any point in time, but the response to “When thinking about your family, what 
comes to mind? What kind of family is your family?” her response was: “Perfectionism, 
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academics first, funny” (Koyomi, age 21). The participant’s response brings the topic of 
education as the forerunner within the household, greatening the pressure placed on 
students to gain an education. The earlier quote by the oldest respondent within the cohort 
mentioned that the respondent would like to make “education the center of freedom” 
(Akiko, age 30) as a main component in their ideal family, showing that education is still 
deemed as important on both sides of the age range, with the respondents 21 and 30 years 
of age, respectively. The pressure within the family to succeed and find careers is thus 
changing students’ viewpoints on family, and potentially changing it rather slowly over 
time with the solid grip of education still holding fast.  
5.2 The Modern Japanese Family Ideal as Described by University 
Students—Special Attention to Household Types 
Family ideals are typically derived from the influence of the household within which one 
grows up in, making it likely that individuals will be expected to form families from their 
previous experiences with family. 21.7% of the students who responded to the 
questionnaire are members of stem-family households, with the remaining 78.3% within 
the typical nuclear household model. In terms of the ideal family the respondents would 
like in the future, only two of the respondents gave any inclination towards a stem-family 
model, with attitudes towards having families with children and the husband’s parents 
under one roof: 
“I want to raise my own child while taking care of my and my husband's parents, 
making love and education the center of our independence and making friends and 
family” (Akiko, 30 years of age); 
“A family where three generations live together. Not like my own [current] 
family” (Yui, 20 years of age). 
While two students mentioned a stem-family as an ideal, one of these particular students 
was surprisingly the oldest student among the participants, aged 30, making it a question 
of the divide between the younger students and their older counterparts within the 
university system in Japan. However, the other student who responded an ideal towards 
a multigenerational household is only 20 years old, showing that family ideals are unique 
in any given age cohort. Additionally, the mention of including friends within the concept 
and manifestation of family shows a further diverting definition of family that is only 
heightened by the inclusion of independence in the definition.  
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In addition, 15 respondents expressed their wants for having a nuclear family model in 
the future, consisting of a partner and children, five expressed desire for a family with 
respect, love, calm and friendly or with a deep connection, while five individuals 
expressed that they “will not get married”, but then one responded that their ideal family 
is one where they “work together and make time for family” (Ryosuke, age 20), 
contradicting their earlier response. The opposing respondent could, thus, want a family, 
but plans to have a family without marrying, which sadly cannot be deduced solely by the 
responses gathered, or could even be an error in computing the responses.  
A recurring theme that came in the answers to the questions “What kind of family do you 
want to have in the future? What is the ideal family for you?” and “What kind of family 
is the ideal Japanese family? Is it similar to your ideal future family?” is that many of the 
respondents want more children than anticipated through previous research. Of the 23 
respondents, nine respondents indicated that they would like “many children” or “2 or 
more” and four would like to at least have one child with their partners, showing a clear 
view that the ideal household in their opinions is a household with a couple and their 
children, further indicating that a nuclear family household style has become the ideal. 
However, a good point brought up by a 21-year-old female student, Hikari, from a stem-
family, mentioned her views on ideal families, in that there is no sole ideal family, 
especially within the young adult spheres, but that there are clear constraints in the 
concept of “ideal family” by older generations that align with the ie ideology: 
“I think that the ideal family in Japan is different between young people and those 
who are not. In the case of young people, there is no ideal family. For example, 
having no children is also an option. On the other hand, older people think that to 
the parents [the ideal family] is to have wives, husbands and children, and the 
couple take care of their parents”. 
Hikari’s viewpoint shows that there are different types of ideals for every person, 
especially for different age groups, making it difficult to express the ideal family in any 
given culture, least of all in the Japanese context. However, this respondent did not 
mention whether her ideal family will include older generations under one roof like the 
family she grew up with or if she envisions it to be more towards the nuclear family 
model. Still, she mentions that she would like to “have two or three children”, showing a 
clear division towards nontraditional family ideals, as well as traditional family ideals. 
The clear distinction created by the respondent is on point with understanding the views 
of young adults as well as the previous generations, defining the conundrum of diverging 
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family ideals and the rift between the generations, even with the presence of the traditional 
ideals. 
Household types were of specific importance for the students in describing their current 
and ideal families, making households a significant component of family. Ideal family 
and household preferences correlate in majority with the households the respondents grew 
up with, but also show variances when looking from the perception of the education levels 
of the parents. Figure 2 indicates the education levels of the parents for each respondent, 
with only one respondent absenting. Corelating the education levels of the parents helps 
further understand the traditional and nontraditional viewpoints with potentially matching 
of the education level to the indicated household type of the family as well as towards the 
attitudes of the current generation of students who will be potential parents in the future. 
With the inclusion of vocational, university, graduate as well as other to indicate high 
school or any other type of education level possible, the majority of parents have at least 
a university degree, with ten mothers and 16 fathers with university or graduate level 
degrees, and seven mothers and three fathers with vocational, or technical, level 
education. Though fewer mothers and fathers have a graduate level degree, but the 
questionnaire indicates that the majority of university students were raised by parents 
with above high school level education. The high levels of education can, therefore, be 
used to determine that a fraction of university students attend university with pressures 
from their parents, and this pressure helps facilitate the development of nontraditional 
family ideals.  
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5.3 Desire Towards Having a Family—Marriage and Children 
Amongst the respondents, getting married was more prevalent, with 18 of the 23 
indicating they would like to get married. Of those five respondents who noted they would 
not like to get married, three were female and the other two were male. However, in 
reference to having children, only three respondents said that they would not like to have 
children, but surprisingly three of the respondents would like to have children even 
without getting married, and one demonstrated a desire to get married but not have 
children, clearly showing nontraditional family ideals and attitudes. As previously 
mentioned, the desire to have more than the average number of children was witnessed 
in the responses by nine of the participants, heightening the importance of having children 
within the cohort. 
Having a family was expressed as a central aspect of life by the respondents, taking 
precedence in life and even being illustrated as another meaning for life:  
“Creating a family, no matter how many children there are, my life will become 
interesting, I wonder if [family] is another meaning for living” (Akiko, age 30). 
The addition that the number of children does not matter within the concept of family, 
but that any number will create an increasingly interesting life that will add the meaning 
of family in the end. However, one respondent expressed that they have heard people 
change upon having children but failed to expand on the connotation that the notion of 
change brings, whether it is a good change or if the fact that parents change upon having 
children is a detriment in society.  
From a differing perspective, the drive for wanting to have one’s own family could also 
come from having their family being taken away from them at a young age, that creating 
their own family will help fill that void from when they lost their parents: 
“I am now lonely because I lost my parents, so I would like my own family” 
(Momoko, age 21). 
The connotations of loss and loneliness heighten the need to create one’s own family as 
well as derive further meaning about the impact family has on individuals at any age.  
In terms of having the desire to have children and get married, an interview I conducted 
with a female Japanese language instructor in March 2018 brought insight on the topic 
firsthand. Through conversations with her, it became apparent to me that though she is a 
career centered woman in the workforce, her intrinsic wants for having children will not 
be swayed by her desire for a career or helping Japanese society in a collective manner 
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by helping increase the population. The respondent’s answers towards questions 
regarding the decreasing fertility in Japan proved that though she is worried for the sake 
of Japan, it is her wants and desires that will determine whether she will get married and 
have children. When asked whether Japan’s current situation would impact her decision 
to have children, she was adamant that it is through purely her selfish wants of having 
children, even if she feels that the path Japan’s population is heading in is “not very 
good,” because it has been her dream to have her own family with a husband and two 
children, and maybe even pets, since she was a little girl living with both her parents and 
grandparents (Anonymous, 2018). The interviewee’s thoughts on population decline were 
well-informed, making it obvious that she understands the issue at hand, but that it  will 
not deter her in changing her viewpoint on having a family of her own. Her background 
in being raised in a multigenerational household could be an essential key to fully 
understanding her views on wanting children and getting marriage, which will be further 
discussed in the discussion chapter.  
The topic of wanting children and marriage came up in discussion as well, but differently 
than from the aforementioned interview. The most essential aspect from the discussion 
with university students at Senshu University was that the need, or want, to have children 
stems from “personality” and a “sense of self,” as one student eloquently put the issue of 
their generation of not wanting to have children, or even get married, for that matter. This 
shows a counter view for wanting children and family from the questionnaires and the 
interview as mentioned. The evolution of the manner family is viewed as has changed 
with the emergence of independent thought and gender equality, and many Japanese 
university students and recent graduates value finding jobs to maintain their economic 
and financial health, rather than focusing on relationships and having children and 
families. These changes are a major contributor in why people are not wanting to have 
children and the students imbued the same ideas on the matter.   
The connection among the student’s own wants to have children stemmed from their 
internal need to want to have children as well as their external ability to be able to have 
children and/or get married. Many voiced their concerns about being able to financially 
take care of children after they graduate and find stable jobs with the competition they 
are facing on the job market, and the pressure to find life-long careers like their parents 
and older generations. A common concern aside from financial stability was the ability 
to raise the children themselves, since the Japanese working hours are long and arduous; 
in their parent’s generations, the grandparents assisted in caring for the children, making 
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childrearing much easier for the salaryman father and the not yet liberated housewives. 
The emergence of childcare facilities allowed for the mothers to find jobs outside the 
home and aspire for the same living standards as their male counterparts. However, the 
trust in the use and accessibilty of daycare facilities has waned in recent years and does 
not appeal to the next generation of parents, since there is a level of uncertainty associated 
with finding adequate placements for their offspring, with many needing to establish and 
reserve spots six to twelve months in advance after the government’s Angel Plan 
initiatives in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Between the financial responsibility and 
negative attitudes towards the ability of the government to provide enough jobs and 
benefits, or the general undesirable attitudes towards having children, the future of 
Japan’s prosperity remains on the line with the next generation of parents according to 
my discussion with the students.  
5.4 Necessity of Children and Marriage in Family? 
White’s earlier reflection shows the vast contrast between Western ideologies of “starting 
a family” happens when a couple has children, versus that of their Japanese counterparts, 
where family is an elemental aspect of life, that much like air, it is a constant entity 
surrounding people. Getting married and having children are not necessarily a necessity 
within Japanese culture for people to have families. However, it is clear that having 
children and getting married are expectations that have held steadfastly within societal 
norms. In response to the question “Do you think that marriage or having children are 
important in a ‘family?’”, the majority, 14 participants, responded “Yes”, while nine 
responded “No”, showing that the topic of family has a split view on terminology and 
definition. The divide also shows that perhaps children are not a necessary part of the 
equation anymore in terms of definitiveness.  
As expressed by those who indicated that children and marriage are important in a family, 
family is rooted in tradition and history from generations ago as well as indicating that 
creating one’s own home is a big stepping stone in life that produces further responsibility 
much like adulthood: 
“Because we can inherit tradition and make family history. By doing so, you can 
have pride in what was born in that family” (Rio, age 19); 
“Because having a new home yourself is a very important life's milestones and 
experience. By having a child, you can do whatever you can to protect the child. 
55/86 
And by having a big sense of responsibility that is not so far, I will raise one more” 
(Yui, age 20), 
The viewpoints emphasize the point of reference that family is a strong component of the 
culture within Japan. Additionally, voices towards family and children as a possible 
outcome for a family showed that  
“if a person of trust and love becomes part of their own daily life, the format does 
not need to be so much obsessed about” (Rei, age 21), 
but rather that “It is possible to live alone in this day and age” (Ryosuke age 20) without 
marriage or children as parts of the equation for family, “Although it is rare in Japan, you 
can have a family without marrying” (Tsuchiya, age 23). The points of view by the male 
respondents show less emotion towards the issue of family formation and ideals than the 
responses given by the female respondents, which could be attributed to gender bias in 
the ability to have careers even with families. However, the responses also show an 
empathy towards the fact that there are many definitions of family that are not dictated 
by the principles set by ie. An attitude towards the progressive attitude of accepting 
communities, friends and even pets as “family” brings a new light for the 
conceptualization of family with the addition that blood relations are not a necessity: 
“Because I think that we will call communities that live together, such as friends, 
not married partners, pets etc. as family” (Koyomi, age 21).  
“Because I think there are various shapes of families. Even without marriage, even 
though not connected by blood, I think that if you think that you are a family even 
if you are not family member in the eyes of the law, you can call it family” 
(Kurumi, age 21). 
This specific view is along the lines of Western ideals where family has begun to adopt 
new definitions to include non-blood related individuals, as well as animals, into the fold 
of family-related entities. The heightened acceptance of those not traditionally family in 
the eyes of the law provides a new meaning for the conceptualization of family as well as 
the inclusion of nontraditional ideals. 
Nonetheless, having children was deemed as an experience that many of the respondents 
would like to experience, even if children and marriage are not necessarily prerequisites 
for a family to be officially termed a family. 
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“I do not often think that children are cute. Maybe some parents do not like 
children so much. Therefore, even if there are no children, there is no problem and 
I think that it is totally up to individual freedom. Still I am planning to have 
children as well because I believe that childbirth and childrearing are wonderful 
experiences” (Hikari, age 21). 
The variations in responses show that even within similar ideals for what a family is, there 
are differing opinions from those who wish to have children, and those who plan to get 
married. These differences show an increased individuality that are not dictated by the 
thoughts of others. 
On a virtually different note, a commonality within the answers was that “fun”, 
“happiness”, “support” and “being happy” are the key to a family, even if the indicated 
answer pointed towards either or. These indications show that any form of family can 
represent an acceptable view towards what a family is, and that family is up to 
interpretation by the people involved rather than for society to dictate by obsolete ideals. 
This further validates the notion that there are increasing amounts of nontraditional family 
ideals emerging among Japanese university students that are helping to change the overall 
concept of family in the Japanese context.  
5.5 Attitudes Toward the Declining Birthrate as an Impact on 
Individual Lives 
A major issue impacting family formation in Japan is declining birthrates. As previously 
mentioned, a replacement rate of 2.1 TFR is needed to sustain the population at its current 
state; however, with the decreasing number of children being born to eligible couples as 
well as women in their fertility years, maintaining the demographic numbers has become 
a predicament in recent years. As such, one of the major questions I posed for the 
questionnaire, as well as the discussion at Senshu, deals with the attitudes of university 
students toward the declining birthrate and whether they think that it will impact them in 
the future.  
Between the questionnaire and the discussion, a major theme that came up is for the 
connotation towards “worry” in reference to the impact of the declining birthrates. 20 out 
of 23 specified that they do worry about or that there have been impacts that have come 
with the declining birthrates, with 2 not clarifying in what manner they will be impacted 
or about what specifically they worry about. Major concerns were raised in terms of 
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pensions, less prioritization of the young as the government is forced to dedicate further 
funds toward the ageing population, economic decline, neglect towards the elderly, and 
the decreasing demographic availability to take over jobs to help support the economy 
and nation in years to come.  
Excellent points were brought up about the reasoning for the declining birthrates, such as 
interest towards intimacy and romantic relationships and a lack in the ability for balancing 
work and life:  
“I consider two aspects why Japan is declining birthrate. The first one is a 
physiological issue, because there are more Japanese people who are not 
interested in falling in love, getting married or having sex in the first place […] 
The second is the problem of the external environment, and despite the increasing 
number of women who value their careers, at this stage there is not enough 
environment to balance career, childbirth and parenting. Many working women 
are afraid to give birth in their twenties in their proper birth period. As Japan has 
a low birthrate, I think it would be nice if I had three children. It is sad that 
Japanese people will disappear in the future” (Hikari, age 21). 
These ideas about the population decline show there is a common understanding on the 
impact of the fertility crisis, but there remain those students who do not understand the 
consequences that are possible with the continuing decline in births per capita. The 
understanding is seen through the acknowledgement of the crisis and the impact the 
decisions the potential parents make in regards to children and marriage. As Hikari 
pointed out, having three children for her would be a way to help alleviate the strain on 
the birthrate, but unfortunately, the actions of only one does little to outweigh that of the 
rest of the nation’s and individuals’ lack in desire towards having children.  
On another note, with the increased pension funds going to the ageing population, there 
is an increased worry that the future children will not be taken care of by the society, 
showing a differing view towards having children by members of the same cohort.  
Rio, age 19: “With the introduction of the pension system, we feel that much of 
the money we worked on is often retired, and young children are less likely to be 
prioritized”. 
The doubt towards the current pension system proves to be a source for concern by the 
student respondents and deters trust to be instilled on the system as a way to promote 
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childbearing but should be used as further traction towards having an increased number 
of children.  
As with the questionnaire respondents, during the discussion with Senshu University 
students it became apparent that the students, ages 21 to 30, some barely knew about the 
dire impact the demographic crisis will have on their lives. However, it became apparent 
that social media and the press are impacting their view on the topic, with many agreeing 
that the government is striving to provide more daycare facilities in the future in hopes of 
increasing the incentives for having children, but that the current situation does not make 
them feel optimistic about the future of childbearing. Alternatively, an increasing 
response by the students showed a differing view to those who responded to the survey. 
Multiple students during the discussion mentioned that creating more robotics in the years 
to come will help offset the decreasing population in terms of replacing the lost labor 
forces. The loss of available people to replace jobs was acknowledged in the survey as 
well, in that the main industries will lack the labor necessary to maintain the society and 
economy, impacting all the people in Japan: 
“It is because I think that a declining birthrate will bring about a decrease in 
Japan's working population and a decline in consumers. I think that this will 
reduce the Japanese economy” (Sosuke, age 22); 
“Because there will be no successor to various occupations (especially in the 
primary industries)” (Yui, age 20).  
These views, though understandable, indicate that there is a discord in governmental 
messaging with the general populace that have created views that do not address the main 
issue, as Goodman (2002), Mackie (2002), and White (2002) highlight in their research.  
This will be further discussed in the next chapter, Discussion. 
5.6 Family-related Stigmas within Japanese Society 
The complexities of the definitions for stigma and taboo make it relatively difficult to 
translate properly into the Japanese contexts, with the use of katakana, or Japanese 
characters for foreign words, needed to display the terminology properly. As such, 
receiving data on stigmas from university students was impeded with the terminology 
needed to be translated into the Japanese context for the proper understanding on the 
respondents’ sides. Thus, comparing “stigma” to “taboo” was a necessity required in 
explaining stigmas, but led to a misconception of stigmas as taboos, which, as previously 
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stated, are vastly different. However, with the use of “taboo”, the understanding of 
perhaps “not socially acceptable” was understood as the primary meaning, allowing for a 
loose understanding of the questions related to stigmas as related to family in the Japanese 
context. 
A vast majority of respondents did not understand the meaning of stigma, with 18 of the 
23 stating they did not comprehend the term, while only five noted that they understood 
prior to being given a definitive meaning to the concept. The inclusion of a brief 
definition, that stigmas are negative attributes pressed against an individual by others or 
social groups, gave a subtle introduction to stigmas, so that the respondents were able to 
name a few social stigmas that they have witnessed within society, although the stigmas 
referenced do not apply particularly well towards social stigmas within family as asked 
in the survey.  
Four out of the responses given indicated that single parenthood is considered a social 
stigma, but one of these respondents also mentioned there is a “prejudice that one-parent 
children are unfortunate” (Ayaka, age 22), which follows the line of thinking that “pity” 
is an unfortunate byproduct of stigmas where the connotation that those in single parent 
households are considered “poor thing[s]” but that the “country should firmly take care 
of [the issue]” (Rio, age 19) of single parenthood and children within those households. 
This way of thinking is mentioned in the discussions by Akaishi et al (2004) discuss in 
Voices from Japan’s article, “Are You Afraid to See the Concept of ‘Family” Change?”. 
Moreover, social stigmas within family are considered to originate from the “remnants of 
the old discriminatory hierarchy” (Nami, age 21) where the “wife must take care of her 
husband and the parents” due to the fact that she must be the ryousaikenbo, or good wife, 
while her husband works (Hikari, age 21). These remnants show the stigmatization being 
placed upon woman and men to continue with the old ie family system and gender roles 
as dictated by the state for centuries, especially with the notion that everyone must get 
married. 
Unexpectedly, in terms of stigmas present within Japanese society, three respondents 
named Japanese taboos as being “burakumin” or “discriminated by their birthplace or 
household” (Tsuchiya, age 23) that prevent individuals from being able to live similar 
lives as those from so-called “ordinary families”, such as being able to find jobs or even 
get married. The presumptions that certain individuals are unable to live regular lives 
denotes an underlying, as well as visible, stigmatization of individuals within the social 
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sphere of existence in Japan, so much so that the Japanese characters for burakumin9 
denote the person as “non-human”, dehumanizing the individual to the point of 
unacceptance within society. Nevertheless, these views do not translate properly into the 
understanding of stigmas in the context of Japanese families, leaving the issues of social 
unacceptance of single parent households and illegitimacy unexplored amongst these 
responses when unprompted. 
The notion that single parenthood is seen as a stigma by university students, as well as 
society at large, emphasizes that family cultures are changing, but that there is hope yet 
for the acceptance of single parenthood, as well as other nontraditional family models, 
which will be discussed in the following subchapter with loose consideration toward the 
work-life balance dilemma. As said, the viewpoint toward single parenthood was also 
touched upon in the questionnaire with the straightforward question, “What do you think 
about single parenthood?” that followed the topic of stigmas. The majority of students 
responded positively towards single parenthood, rather than with a negativity as most 
stigmas are associated with, though there were concerns raised with the economic burden 
possibility.  
Nami, age 21: “Upon entering the university I understood that there are various 
family forms when meeting a wide range of people. In that respect, there is no 
negative image about single parents, but I think that there are various parentage 
relationships among single parent families. A sense of responsibility may be born 
even among the children, parent-child bonds may be strengthened.” 
Yuuno, age 22: “Because my family is so, there is no particularly bad image. It is 
very hard, but we can live if we cooperate together.” 
Hikari, age 21: “It is natural that you do not want to divorce and become a single 
parent, but that is not to say that being a single parent is not bad. Single parents 
are respected [in society].” 
These views on single parent households show that those who are from single parent 
households, and those not, still view single parent households in a mostly positive way, 
but that there are difficulties much like any other family type would have. Additionally, 
                                               
9 Burakumin are a part of the “Others” demographic in Japan, in that they are Japanese citizens, but their cultural identities are in question with the majority of Japan (Murphy-Shigematsu and Willis, 2008). The burakumin class are discriminated against their other Japanese counterparts due to their history of partaking in occupations that were not among the most desirable, such as executioners, in the Edo Period (Lützeler, 1995).  
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those students who are members of “stigmatized” households would like to create 
different families to the ones they grew up with: 
“Because my family is so, there is no particularly bad image [toward single 
parenthood]. It is very hard, but we can live if we cooperate together[…] in the 
future I would like to build a different type of family” (Yurino, age 22). 
Though single parent households are difficult to uphold, the perception of the students 
who grew up in such a household where the mother or father was able to succeed in 
parenting, show a more optimistic view towards the family unit.  
Twelve of the 23 respondents indicated that there are stigmas within Japanese families  
when prompted, while only 2 mentioned that “there are not” and 9 abstained or responded 
with “I do not know”. The high rate of abstentions and answers as “I do not know” show 
the lack of understanding of stigmas within households and families as well as the discord 
in willingness to further explore stigmas as a possibility within society. Nevertheless, the 
responses indicating that there are stigmas within Japanese society validate the 
presumption that stigmas are an undercurrent within Japanese families and households 
that need further research and media coverage.  
5.7 The Ideal Family: Possible Aspiration or Fantasy?  
The ideal family by the vast majority of respondents, as aforementioned, is one in which 
consists of a couple and their children, much like the ever popular and persisting nuclear 
family model. However, in addition to a partner and potential children, connotations 
towards helping each other grow as individuals, making time for quality time together, 
joy and happiness even without wealth, but most importantly, the ideal family is similar 
to the families the respondents are striving to have in their futures. These associations 
bring the meaning of family to a greater importance. Nevertheless, there still remains the 
question of whether the ideal family scheme is achievable in the future by university 
students.  
Looking at the perceptions for having the ability to fulfill the family aspirations, 19 of the 
respondents indicated that they think they are able to have their ideal families in the 
future. These respondents were among the ones who indicated that their ideal families 
included both the nuclear family ideal as well as the multigeneration ideal, making it 
difficult to create further connections to indicate exactly which aspect of family makes 
them think they can achieve their ideal. 
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The manifestation of the ideal family is an underlying wish for many, but that life does 
not always go as expected makes having the ideal family a dream that may not come true. 
Three of the 23 respondents indicated that they do not think that they could make their 
ideal family come true in the future, with one person absenting from responding. 
Surprisingly enough, the ones who noted that they do not think they can achieve their 
ideal families were among the respondents who also do not plan on getting married in the 
future, with two of the respondents not wanting children as well. However, the majority 
of the respondents do feel that they are able to create their ideal families, making the 
achievement perhaps more than a fantasy in reality.   
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6.  Discussion 
The following chapter focuses on discussing the data collected by further analyzing the 
attitudes of university students towards Japanese families through the questionnaire 
responses gathered and the discussion by connecting both to the previous literature on the 
topic of family and changing attitudes as outlined in the review of literature and the 
conceptual framework. A discussion of the three entities of this study will allow for a 
comprehensive analysis to help dig deeper into the issues at hand. As such, the discussion 
chapter will ultimately answer the thesis questions as outlined in the introduction chapter 
of this MA thesis:  
 What is the relationship between traditional Japanese family models and the 
family ideals imbued by today’s youth? 
 How has family changed, from the traditional ie family to the new nontraditional 
family ideal? 
 Have traditional family ideals created stigmas in the development of Japanese 
family ideals? 
Answering these questions will thus give an in depth understanding of the view of 
university students on family and how their attitudes align with the literature on traditional 
ie values and those of nontraditional ones in a time of demographic dismay.  
 
6.1 The Japanese Family: Attitudes Away from ie Toward New 
Family Ideals 
The changes that have taken place within the Japanese family prove that there are many 
remnants of the traditional ie ideology present, but that there are also new families coming 
into existence. As Hendry (2012) expresses, there is no longer a physical family that lasts 
generations and stands today, but that families are changing to incorporate ideals that are 
void in the traditional ie household. As mentioned previously in the analysis, a common 
view that the ideal family in Japan is diverging between the new generations and the old, 
where the traditional ie conceptualization is more present in the older generations, where 
as in the new, it is not so strict. 
“The ideal family in Japan is different between young people and those who are 
not. In the case of young people, there is no ideal family. For example, having no 
children is also an option. On the other hand, older people think that to the parents 
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[the ideal family] is to have wives, husbands and children, and the couple take 
care of their parents” (Hikari, age 21) 
This shows that perhaps the ie family system is approaching a new terminology in coming 
years as further generations begin to have different ideals and attitudes in terms of family. 
Furthermore, Kumagai and Hendry analyze that marriage in Japan has changed 
dramatically where adults are choosing to marry for love rather than through arranged 
marriages set up by their parents, or perhaps choosing to not marry at all as five of the 23 
informants in the questionnaire indicated, that they do not want to get married in the 
future. As furthering away from the traditional ie ideology, one respondent also 
mentioned that they would like to not marry, but still plan to have children, validating 
Matsumoto’s research on individualistic collectivism where he notes that couples are 
choosing to live together with or without children, but never choosing to have a typical 
marriage, but rather common-law marriages. These changes were readily seen in the 
responses by the university students questioned, validating that attitudes are changing in 
terms of marriage and children.  
Choe, Bumpass, Tsuya, and Rindfuss (2014) argue that these changing views toward 
marriage are the result of an increased drive towards education, that nontraditional family 
models are bred through the pressure for education and careers, rather than dedicating 
time for family. As seen within the views of the university students, each of whom is a 
university attendee, education is a main part of life. When looking at the education levels 
of the parents, the majority of the respondents’ parents, both mother and father, had high 
levels of education, with 17 of the mothers with above high school level education and 
19 of the fathers with higher education levels. The high emphasis on education by the 
parents’ generation as well as the current generation correlates to deepening 
nontraditional family attitudes. It will be interesting to see the future correlation of 
education with the changing family models. 
Takenobu’s article heightens the value placed on family bonds, but that “family bonds” 
and “community” are not “dependent on a simplistic view of the family structure: man as 
breadwinner and woman as unpaid laborer” (pp. 23-24), showing that it has become an 
impossible task to simply define the family and ie in the direction that Japanese families 
are embarking. However, as aforesaid, the one commonality is that family creates a sense 
of security and stability that make one comfortable (Akaishi, Suda, Takenobu, & 
Motoyama, 2004), but that it is a lingering of the past need for certainty and fear of 
change. These alternative views on family among university students when presented 
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with the literature, show that the clearly defined boundaries of ie have been loosened to 
allow for nontraditional forces to take root, changing the Japanese concept of family 
further away from traditional to an entirely new definition that knows no limits. The 
increasing focus on community building, as Takenobu suggests, shows the internal and 
external impacts of a need to rely on family members that is shifting the attitudes of young 
adults to form communities rather than start families. Kurumi, age 21, mentioned her 
view on family, that family is not defined solely by blood, but rather through acceptance 
of another into one’s life, and that that it is family as well:  
“Because I think there are various shapes of families. Even without marriage, even 
though not connected by blood, I think that if you think that you are a family even 
if you are not family member in the eyes of the law, you can call it family”. 
This further validates that family has no specific boundaries and that a community in itself 
can be called a family as well. Detracting the blood-relation away from the concept is a 
clear deviation away from the traditionalistic view on ie, dissolving the strict components 
gradually over time. 
When the idea of family comes to mind for American researchers like me, typically 
children come to the forefront of the image of family. As White (2002) describes in her 
comparison of family between American and Japanese family cultures, she reflects that: 
“There is no question that children are important in Japan, the more so for the 
assumption that you will have them, that it’s ‘like air’—natural, expected, needed, 
elemental. But children don’t start a family. Rather, they continue it and help 
focus and shape relationships within the household. They also influence the 
virtues and values that shape a sense of family beyond its walls. Further, having 
children is not part of a dream of individual happiness—apparently, neither is 
getting married—or at least so the representations of young women’s dreams 
would indicate” (pp. 99-100). 
Though accurate to a certain degree, White’s research is not validated entirely with the 
analysis of the respondents’ views on family. A female respondent mentioned that 
“’having a family’ has a serious meaning, a little more than that it is not just an extension 
of romance” (Nami, age 21), highlighting the importance of family beyond the romantic 
sense of love, accentuating the meaning of family towards the future. The sense that 
“having a family” brings for the student is different than White’s own research, that once 
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the student begins their own family, that is when the family starts, rather than having the 
family already a formulated idea, especially with the data that shows not all the students 
plan to have their own family fully equipped with marriage and children. Nevertheless, 
evidence to White’s research is briefly witnessed through responses that deal with “fun 
memories” and childhood memories, bringing the idea that a different form of family is 
at the forethought. These differing ideas on “starting a family” show that no one right 
form is alone in existence, that perhaps the students are heading towards ideas that are 
more in alignment with the Western ideas of family, away from the traditional Japanese 
family, but with remnants of the old ideology steadfastly holding on. The connotation that 
is left with these responses points towards a further importance being placed on family in 
the past during childhood, making it apparent that family is still as relevant today as it 
was in the past, but also that family is changing constantly, though at a slow pace, much 
like memories and time.  
Attitudes toward single parenthood and illegitimacy were different than expected, but 
also held similar attitudes as mentioned in Akaishi et al., in that stigmatized individuals 
in Japan hold an oppressed connotation that is creating an image that being a single parent 
or illegitimate is viewed as a “pity” by others, which is a negative attribute being applied 
to the concept of family, thus, a stigma. Four out of the responses given indicated that 
single parenthood is considered a social stigma, but one of these respondents also 
mentioned there is a “prejudice that one-parent children are unfortunate” (Ayaka, age 22), 
which follows the line of thinking that “pity” is an unfortunate byproduct of stigmas 
(Akaishi et al, 2004) where the connotation that those in single parent households are 
considered “poor thing[s]” that need to be taken care of. This way of thinking is 
mentioned in the discussions by Akaishi et al (2004) discuss in Voices from Japan’s 
article, “Are You Afraid to See the Concept of ‘Family” Change?”. Moreover, social 
stigmas within family are considered to originate from the “remnants of the old 
discriminatory hierarchy” (Nami, age 21) according to one particular respondent, where 
the “wife must take care of her husband and the parents” due to the fact that she must be 
the ryousaikenbo, or good wife, while her husband works (Hikari, age 21). These 
remnants show the stigmatization being placed upon woman and men to continue with 
the old ie family system as dictated by the state for centuries, especially with the notion 
that everyone must get married. However, as already mentioned, these notions are 
departing from the conceptualization of family with new definitions being bred. 
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6.2 Changing Attitudes and Ideals as Culprit for Declining 
Birthrates 
The topic of declining birthrates as well as attitudes for having children by university 
students can be associated with the Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis by Lutz et al (2006) 
and Matsumoto’s concept of “IC duality”. The LFTH, as aforesaid, takes into 
consideration three aspects that are changing the views on childbearing: demographic, 
sociological, and economic, with the sociological perspective fitting those of the 
university students questioned for the purpose of this study. In short, the essence of the 
LFTH is that the current generation of has been socialized to think that it is acceptable 
for them to have few to no children at all, due to their parents and elders having fewer 
children than their earlier counterparts (Lutz, Skirbekk, & Testa, 2006). Like mentioned, 
the perception is well-matched to the study on nontraditional family attitudes by Choe et 
al (2014). When combined with the results of this study, it becomes apparent that the 
increased desire for individual freedoms and educationally driven paths have resulted in 
varied views on family, including nontraditional attitudes as well as attitudes have 
remnants of the old ie ideology. These views, therefore, have led to decreasing wants for 
having children within society, but that not all young adults share these views on 
childrearing. 
Sociological reasoning as the basis for changing attitudes towards lower fertility and ideal 
family size demonstrate that with the normalization of witnessing fewer children within 
age cohort groups and in passing throughout one’s formative years, will result in smaller 
personal ideal family structures by the potential future fertility cohort. However, this 
cannot be said as true for all cases as the results of the questionnaire indicate. Many of 
the respondents mention that they would like to have anywhere from one to perhaps three 
children, showing that not only are there students who would like to have more children 
than the average per capita seen in today’s statistics, but that there are students who were 
raised in households with more than a couple children, making it so that their conditioning 
towards accepting the notion of having fewer children did not come directly from their 
own household circumstances, but rather a combination of internal family factors as well 
as societal ones. One of the students mentioned that she grew up with six siblings who 
were taken care of by their single mother, but that her ideal family is a family in which 
there is a couple and a child (Natsuki, age 20), making it so that her views on family are 
not only formulated through her experiences within her family, but also through external 
influences, much like Lutz et al indicate in their research. The normalization of society 
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having fewer children from the perspective of individuals is, thus, gradually moving 
towards the societal acceptance of fewer children as desires are changing for the youth 
and young adults who will perhaps be parents in the coming years.  
As the youth are becoming more individualistic in values and are now leaning towards a 
value system centered around “individualistic collectivism” (Sugimura & Mizokami, 
2013) where individual desires come first, but an underlying concern and effort is made 
for society comes second. Matsumoto (2002) coins this predicament where the youth are 
more individualistic in nature than their parents and grandparents who still value higher 
collectivistic tendencies, as IC duality. This has been evident in the changes from the 
school-to-work formula to a school-to-university-to-career formula, thus, making it so 
that adolescents begin to think about their futures earlier than their parents and 
grandparents (Sugimura & Mizokami, 2013, p. 135), but the futures that they are thinking 
of revolve around their careers rather than the families that they will begin. These views 
are accentuated through the young age of students entering university, as evidenced by 
the age range of the respondents in the questionnaire as well as the high levels in education 
by the parents of the university students, showing that the drive for educations and careers 
already begins much earlier than with the preceding generations. According to 
Matsumoto and Sugimura and Mizokami, the increased pressure for higher education are 
therefore pushing marriage and children until much later on in life, shifting the balance 
in terms of birthrates and family formation. The struggle between “individualism” and 
“collectivism” is seen through the want of young adults to have children, much like the 
majority of the respondents where only three indicated that they do not want children in 
the future, but through the future entrance into the workforce and increased drive to fulfill 
careers, it becomes clear that it is much harder to give up on a career path for a 
childrearing path without high intrinsic needs for wanting children, because of the 
increasing opportunity cost associated with marriage and childrearing, while the financial 
costs of staying single and childless are dropping (Schoppa, 2006, p. 68), showing that 
the financial pressures of higher educated careers with higher living costs are creating 
less opportunities for childrearing while at the same time preventing time available to 
dedicate to one’s family. 
Research by Sugimura and Mizokami (2013) differs to some extent from an 
aforementioned interview I conducted with a female Japanese language instructor but is  
further evidenced as individualistic tendencies by Matsumoto et al (1996), Matsumoto 
(2002), and Triandis (2001). The interview brought to mind the dedication one has to their 
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career, but that individual desires for having children help in determining the ability of 
one’s career as well as financial situation for childbearing. Through conversations with 
her, it became apparent to me that though she is a career centered woman in the workforce 
who wants to remain in the workforce for years to come, her intrinsic wants for having 
children will not be swayed by her desire for a career nor helping Japanese society in a 
collective manner by helping increase the population. The interviewee’s answers towards 
questions regarding the decreasing fertility in Japan were similar to answers in the 2009 
Declining Birthrate White Paper by the Government of Japan in which nearly half of the 
respondents indicated that the decreasing population and fertility rates are not good for 
the nation as well as that they “more or less dangerous” (Winter & Teitenlbaum, 2013, p. 
198). This shows that there is an understanding towards the issues Japan is facing in terms 
of fertility and population decline, but also that there are few to little incentives towards 
acting upon the societal pressures as the government would like. Additionally, the 
respondent indicated towards whether Japan’s current situation would impact her decision 
to have children, to which she was adamant that purely her individualistic wants for 
having children will motivate her towards having children, even if she feels that the path 
Japan’s population is heading in is “not very good,” because it has been her dream to have 
her own family with a husband and two children, and maybe even pets, since she was a 
little girl (Anonymous, 2018). The interview helps further beg the questions for whether 
family formation schemes to increase fertility rates can only occur with genuine want for 
having children or Japan’s current status little impact on the decisions and whether the 
future generation will lack the basic desires for children through family formation and, in 
the end, having a detrimental impact on family formation.   
During the discussion with Senshu University students, it became apparent that the 
students, ages 21 to 30, barely knew about the dire impact the crisis will have on their 
lives. To begin my discussion, I decided to show them the statistics that were projected 
by the IPSS in April and see their reactions. Surprisingly enough, they were staggered at 
the numbers projected for 2065, 88.08 million to 94.9 million depending on the low or 
high projections as aforementioned, versus those today, 126 million, and appeared 
genuinely concerned for the prospects of Japan’s prosperity in the sight of the 
dramatically dropping population forecasts (National Institute of Population and Social 
Security Research). One of the name questions I asked during our discussion was, “what 
do you think your generation and Japan in general can do to combat the shortage of people 
in the work force by 2065” and the general consensus was that “robots will take over the 
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jobs,” showing the lack of attentiveness in thinking about the future of Japan in a 
sustainable manner.  
However, it became apparent that social media and the press are impacting the views of 
university students on the topic, because multiple students mentioned that creating more 
robotics in the years to come will help offset the decreasing population in terms of 
replacing the lost labor forces. These views, though understandable, indicate that there is 
a discord in governmental messaging with the general populace, as Goodman (2002), 
Mackie (2002), and White (2002) highlight in their research. Robotics as a method for 
replacing lost labor forces is not a solution to the issue of falling birthrates, but the attitude 
of university students towards robotics as a solution also show the success of the social 
media messaging on the topic, but further discussion and practice are needed to decrease 
the gap between successful and failed family formation incentives.  
The changing ideals away from the traditionalistic conceptualization of family has led to 
a rift between the ie ideology and the ideals imbued by today’s young adults. These 
changes have led to further individualistic ideals that are decreasing the desires for 
marriage and children, and even changing the ideas on family where now friends and non-
blood relatives can be the members of a family. These changes have brought further 
acceptance of nontraditional family formats, such as single parenthood and children out 
of wedlock, where students do not feel like they are as bad as in previous years. However, 
the social stigmas persist in the thinking that children in such families are pitied, making 
the issue of stigmas still very much a part of Japanese families.  
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7.  Conclusion 
Research based on questionnaires directed at and discussions with university students to 
gauge the attitudes toward family ideals in the midst of traditionalistic values, this study 
has shown the vastness in attitudes toward family in Japan and how student experiences 
in society help formulate their views rather than their experiences with their families as 
previously hypothesized. By bringing the perspectives of students to light, this MA thesis 
has contributed to the understanding of university student family ideals as well as into the 
prevalence of nontraditional families. Through the analysis of the questionnaire data and 
discussions, this study has shed further light into the individualistic nature of students that 
helps shape the newly found ideals students embody in Japanese society. Research into 
the current state of the Japanese fertility crisis is necessary, but further emphasis needs to 
be placed on the future parents of Japan as this study has established. From focusing on 
future attitudes for family formation towards the understanding of the remnants of the 
traditionalistic ideology of ie that have created stigmas for nontraditional families to the 
emerging ideals by young adults, this study helps evidenced the lessening of stigmas for 
the future creation a society geared towards inclusive parenting policies and societal 
acceptance of all family types, there are many aspects of the current attitudes and other 
aspects of Japanese families that need to be further researched.  
Previous literature on the topics of ie and Japanese families, single parenthood and 
illegitimacy as well as young adult attitudes shows that the concept of ie has transformed 
within the past century and that there is no one definition of family within the Japanese 
context (Choe et al, 2014; Goodman, 2002; Hendry, 2012; Himeoka, 2008; Kumagai, 
2008, 2014; Roberts, 2002, 2016; Ueno, 2009; White, 2002). Research by these Japan 
experts have helped develop the understanding into the transformation of the modern 
concept of the Japanese family to one which heightens the importance of family within 
the Japanese context and how the definition of family has changed from prehistoric times 
to incorporate modern definitions and ideals that are continuously changing. With the 
evolving concept of households, a decrease has been seen through the reduction of 
multigenerational households, in contrast to the increasing amounts of nuclear households 
that have been on the rise since the 20th century, but there have been surprising increases 
in single-person households, as young adults are living alone and choosing not to marry 
nor create their own families as they continually dedicate their time towards careers and 
educations. With the changing household types and ideals, stigmas have become ever 
present with nontraditional family formats, such as single parenthood as well as children 
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born outside of wedlock, among others not discussed in this thesis. These nontraditional 
families have then seen discrimination by their traditional family counterparts within 
society and their communities. These parallels have created a need for further research to 
be done on the attitudes of young adults to understand the visions of the potential future 
parents to help steer the future of Japanese family formation towards those better suited 
for the parents of tomorrow, rather than those of parents today and yesterday.  
As the definition of ie is constantly changing and adapting to the newly “modern” world 
young adults are living in, stigmas are developing as remnants of the past Japanese family 
structure as the attitudes of the potential parents of tomorrow are changing beyond those 
of traditional norms toward nontraditional ideals. With the Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis 
by Lutz et al (2006) and individual collectivism/IC duality as distinguished by Matsumoto 
(2002) and Sugimura and Mizokami (2013) as frames for understanding the changing 
attitudes towards family formation and childbearing predispositions by potential future 
parents who are university students today, a solid understanding is applied to the fertility 
issues plaguing Japan with the increases in individual desires coming before those of the 
traditional ideals where the husband works and the wife takes care of the husband’s 
parents and their children. Additionally, with the Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis, an 
understanding is placed on the normalization of having few to no children as the youth 
are adapting to the ideas that a person or couple does not need children, nor marriage for 
that matter, in their lives. The external impact of others has created a wave of normalcy 
in the formulation of nontraditional families, such as single parenthood, bearing children 
outside of marriage, common-law marriages, etc.  
The results of this MA thesis show that there are many facets to the issue of changing 
family ideals and the fertility crisis. Additionally, it has come to light that there is not 
only one culprit, but multiple, for the decreasing birthrates: the increasing number of 
changing attitudes that are creating varied family ideals away from those dictated by the 
ie ideology. One common take away is that nontraditional ideals are then imbued by the 
majority of respondents, nonetheless clear remnants of traditional ie ideologies are 
present as well in the attitudes of university students toward family ideals. A clear 
indicator for nontraditional family ideals is that idea that non-blood related individuals 
can be members of a “family”. The changing family ideals have begun to incorporate 
friends and community members into the concept of family, decreasing the importance 
of blood relatives outside the “ordinary” household. Additionally, the attitudes also 
showed that children and marriage are not a necessity for a family by today’s youth, that 
73/86 
common-law marriages and living alone are possible as well. These views have 
broadened the definition of family, where the commonalities that can be taken away from 
the respondents for the ultimate definition of family to include the connotations of love, 
support, understanding, an absolute importance, and fun memories. With the newfound 
definitions for family, a surprisingly supportive response was given by the students 
toward single parent households and illegitimate children where many indicated that 
individuals in such households are strong and heroes, though many still viewed these not- 
so-ordinary family parameters as pitiful and something that needs to be taken care of by 
the government.  
As this study has contributed to the study of young adult attitudes toward family 
formation, I propose future studies be conducted to further analyze the impacts of stigmas 
within the attitudes of young adults. The limitations of this study prevented extensive 
research to be conducted on Japanese families, but I propose that rather than by staying 
within the realms of researching university students’ ideals and perspectives on family, 
an intensive study on young adults in general in the 18 to 30 age cohort be conducted to 
gather further evidence of changing family ideals. This proposed future study will, 
therefore, not discriminate young adults based on education levels or currently being in a 
higher education institute. As this study has shown, the attainment of an education does 
not necessarily equal nontraditional family tendencies, nor do the education levels of the 
students’ parents. To further discover the attitudes of young adults, studies that are 
inclusive to students in trade and vocational schools, as well as students who enter the 
workforce directly after finishing their secondary education, could provide concrete 
evidence for patterns in family formation and ideals, to get a sense of the meaning of 
family at a larger, societal scale, rather than the small one this study has given. Choe, 
Bumpass, Tsuya, and Rindfuss (2014) hypothesize that these changing views toward 
marriage and children are the result of an increased drive towards education, that 
nontraditional family models are bred through the pressure for education and careers, 
rather than dedicating time for family. However, I wonder if Japanese youth in the same 
age range, but with different career and life aspirations have similar changing ideals as 
the ones in higher education, or if education is the driving force for changing ideals seen 
today? As each of the respondents to this study were university students, finding 
alternative information from different cohorts, as well as different regions in Japan in the 
future could help better define the boundaries and definitions of family from the 
perspectives of both the educationally driven and the career driven individuals.  Such a 
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study would further increase the understanding of family in the Japanese context, giving 
insight for further utilizations in the future, from government implementations to the 
betterment of solving the demographic crises. 
I believe that the contribution of this MA thesis shows progress in the study of Japanese 
families, in that no previous research of this nature has been done before. Research on the 
future parents of Japan enables future government implementations to be enacted that are 
guided by the ideals of the current and new generations, rather than the ideals of those 
who are no longer becoming parents. I hope that future studies on the topic will find a 
way to counter the decreasing birthrates and divert the course that Japan’s population 
projections are heading towards. However, the limitations of this study have prevented 
extensive research to be done but has opened a small entry towards understanding 
Japanese families to the full extent of the concept.  
 
*** 
 
This study was conducted for a master’s thesis, and as such, acknowledgement needs to 
be voiced on the limitations of the study and methodology. The originality of this thesis 
shows that prior research has not been done of this nature in reference to university 
students’ attitudes toward families and family-related stigmas as a way to gauge student 
opinions on the demographic issues taking place in Japan. As such, it should be noted that 
this study has seen trial and error. It is acknowledged that aspects of this study could have 
been carried out differently, such as different methods for acquiring data, different 
questions with a possible pilot study to weed out questions unnecessary for the expected 
outcomes, different sample as well as wider sample size that grasps other young adult 
cohorts, etc. Even with the limitations this MA thesis has posed, it is firmly believed that 
this study has provided invaluable, though limited, information towards the study of the 
attitudes of university students. As such, it needs to be noted that any and all faults and 
errors in the thesis are those of the author.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Questionnaire (Japanese Translation) 
 
EU GDPR Regulation: 本調査の目的は、日本の社会中にある家族と関連されているスティグ
マを研究することです。追加研究をため、個人情報を提出することができますが本調査につい
ては必修ではありません。調査の回答はコーディングされて、回答者のお名前と関連された個
人情報は全部とく名で処理されます。また、回答者の個人情報は第三者と共有されません。論
文では、調査の回答と回答者の個人情報の間にどのような関連づけはしていません。調査期間
中いつでも回答者は、調査者(Milla Heikkinen; mimarh@utu.fi)に連絡して、本人の情報を
削除してくれることを要求することができます。本調査のデータは Google Forms を通じて収
集され、トゥルク大学の Seafile に保存されます。研究参加に同意したら以下のボックスにチ
ェックしてください。ご協力に感謝いたします。  
 
 はい 
 
このアンケートに匿名と，お名前のとちらで答えたいですか。該当するものを選ん下さい。 
 匿名 
 お名前 
 
お名前と、メールアドレスを入力してください（匿名希望の方は、メールアドレスのみで大丈
夫です）。 
 
あなたは何歳ですか？ 
 
あなたの性別は何ですか？ 
 女性 
 男性 
 答えたくありません。 
 
あなたは大学の何年生ですか? * 
 1年生 
 2年生 
 3年生 
 4年生 
 その他 
 
お母さんの教育水準は何ですか。 
 なし 
 専門学校 
 大学 
 大学院 
 その他 
 
お父さんの教育水準は何ですか。 
 なし 
 専門学校 
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 大学 
 大学院 
 その他 
 
自分にとって、家族の意味は何と思いますか。 
 
家族を思う時に、どんなことを思い出しますか？  あなたの家族についてどんな家族ですか? 
 
あなたの家族は核家族ですか、それとも拡大家族ですか? 
 核家族 
 拡大家族（三世代家族など） 
 
将来、どんな家族を持ってみたいですか? あなたにとって理想的な家族の姿は何ですか? 
 
理想的な日本の家族とはどんな家族ですか?それは あなたの未来の家族像に似ていますか。 
 
結婚する計画がありますか? 
 はい 
 いいえ 
 子供が欲しいですか? 
 はい 
 いいえ 
 
結婚または子供を持つことが'家族'において重要だと思いますか? 
 はい 
 いいえ 
 
なぜそのように思いますか? 
 
日本の少子化についてどう思いますか? このことで何か心配になりますか?あるいは、あなたに
何か影響を与えていますか？ 
 はい 
 いいえ 
 
なぜそのように思いますか? 
 
あなたは、ワークライフバランスを取ることができると思いますか？ 
 はい 
 いいえ 
 
一人親（片親）にとって、ワークライフバランスを取ることができると思いますか？ 
 はい 
 いいえ 
 
なぜそのように思いますか。 
 
スティグマ (Stigma; 汚名 、烙印；他者や社会集団によって個人に押し付けられた負の表象)
の意味をご存知ですか。(日本の家族に対するタブーとスティグマ) 
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 はい 
 いいえ 
 
次に、よく家族と関係したスティグマを紹介します。あなたはどうを思いますか。 
日本社会には、どんな家族のスティグマがあると思いますか。 
 
日本の家族に対するスティグマがあると思いますか? 
 
養子縁組についてどう思いますか? 
 
一人親（片親）に対してどう思いますか? 
 
自分にとって、養子縁組や一人親（片親）になることを考えてみたことがありますか? 
 
養子縁組や一人親（片親）になるのは、社会にとって“スティグマ”だと思いますか？ 
 はい 
 いいえ 
 
どうしてですか。 
 
あなたは、将来に自分の理想的な家族を作ることができると思いますか？ 
 はい 
 いいえ 
 
その他、ご意見等ございましたらご自由にお書き下さい 
もし追加の質問がある場合、後日連絡をしても大丈夫ですか? 
 はい 
 いいえ 
 
なにとぞご協力の程、よろしくお願い致します。  
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire (English Translation) 
 
EU GDPR Regulation: The purpose of this study is to study families and family-related stigmas within Japanese families. Personal information can be submitted for additional research in the future, but this is not a requirement to take part in the study. Survey responses will be coded, and personal information associated with the respondent's name will be processed in full. In addition, personal information of respondents will not be shared with third parties. In the thesis, there will be no connection between the survey responses and the respondent's personal information if it is so chosen by the respondent. At any time during the survey period, respondents can contact the researcher (Milla Heikkinen; mimarh@utu.fi) and request that the information is deleted. Data from this survey is collected through Google Forms and stored in Seafile at the University of Turku. If you agree to participate in the research, please check the box below. Thank you for your cooperation.   Yes  Do you want to answer this survey anonymously or by name? Please select the appropriate response. 
 Anonymously 
 By name  Please enter your name and e-mail address (If you wish to be anonymous, only your e-mail address if you want to provide it).  What is your age?  What is your gender? 
 Female 
 Male 
 I do not want to answer  What is your level at university? 
 1st Year 
 2nd Year 
 3rd Year 
 4th Year 
 Other  What is your mother's education level? 
 None 
 Vocational school 
 University 
 Graduate School 
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 Other  What is your father's education level? 
 None 
 Vocational school 
 University 
 Graduate School 
 Other  Is your family a nuclear family or a stem-family? 
 Nuclear Family 
 Stem-family (three generation family)  For you, what does family mean?  When thinking about your family, what comes to mind? What kind of family is your family?  What kind of family do you want to have in the future? What is the ideal family for you?  What kind of family is the ideal Japanese family? Is it similar to your ideal future family?  Do you plan to get married? 
• Yes 
• No  
• Do you want children? 
 Yes 
 No  Do you think children or getting married are important in a “family”? 
 Yes 
 No  Why do you think that way?  What do you think about Japan's declining birthrate? Are you worried about this or does it impact you? 
 Yes 
 No  Why do you think that way?  
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Do you think you can have a work-life balance? 
 Yes 
 No  Do you think that single parents can have a work-life balance? 
 Yes 
 No  Why do you think that way?  Do you know the meaning of Stigma (Stigma; Negative representation imposed on to an individual by others or social groups)? (Taboo and Stigma for Japanese Families) 
 Yes 
 No  Next, I will introduce stigmas often associated with family. What do you think about stigmas? What sort of family stigmas do you think exist in Japanese society?  Do you think there is stigmas within Japanese families?  What do you think about adoption?  What do you think about single parenthood?  Have you ever thought about becoming a single parent or adopting?  Do you think that adoption and single parenthood are stigmas within society? 
 Yes 
 No  Why do you think so?  Do you think that you can make your own ideal family in the future? 
 Yes 
 No  Please write freely if you have any other comments.  If I have additional questions, may I contact you later? 
 Yes 
 No  Thank you for your cooperation.  
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Appendix 3: Survey Respondent Characteristics Table Summary 
 
Table 1 Summary of Respondent Characteristics 
 
 
 
  
Pseudonym Age Gender Household Type 
Yurino 22 Female Stem-family 
Rio 19 Female Stem-family 
Tsuchiya 23 Male Nuclear-family 
Shota 18 Male Nuclear-family 
Koshiishi 20 Male Nuclear-family 
Mina 21 Female Nuclear-family 
Nami 21 Female Nuclear-family 
Kurumi 21 Female Nuclear-family 
Sosuke 22 Male Nuclear-family 
Misaki 19 Female Nuclear-family 
Namie 20 Female Nuclear-family 
Risa 19 Female Nuclear-family 
Natsuki 20 Female Nuclear-family 
Ayaka 22 Female Nuclear-family 
Koyomi 21 Female Nuclear-family 
Daiki 21 Male Nuclear-family 
Hikari 21 female Stem-family 
Momoko 21 Female Nuclear-family 
Rei 21 Female Stem-family 
Yui 20 Female Nuclear-family 
Akiko 30 Female Stem-family 
Akari 19 Female Nuclear-family 
Ryosuke 20 Male Nuclear-family 
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Appendix 4: WAKUWAKU Network Visit  
The WAKUWAKU Network 10  is a nonprofit organization dedicated to providing 
assistance to single parents and low-income households through children’s cafeterias at 
little to no cost to parents (Mainichi Japan, 2018). However, the WAKUWAKU Network 
does much more than offter kodomo shokudo, or children’s cafeterias, two times a month. 
Through funds provided by the MHLW and other state and private sponsorships, the 
network is able to provide daycare services, elderly assistance, and create a “sense of 
family and home” (Suzuki, 2018) that the children might not otherwise be able to 
experience in their family life.  
The curator of the WAKUWAKU Network, Ms. Yoshiko Suzuki, was gracious enough 
to provide a brief interview11 during my October 24th visit to the nonprofit organization 
in Ikebukuro, and explained that though the network does provide plenty of assistance for 
the children throughout the workday hours, the network also provides the occassional 
opportunity in the evenings where the parents are able to bring produce and cook for the 
children. These cooking sessions provide an essential opportunity for parents to teach 
cooking to their kids as well as socialize with other parents. Suzuki mentioned that since 
“all Japanese families are isolated today” that bringing a sense of community to parents 
is important for the wellbeing of children and for the parents. The assistance 
WAKUWAKU Network provides is pivotal for the development of the children of single 
parents and the for the work-life balance that single parents strive to have like their 
married and attached counterparts have.  
Learning about the WAKUWAKU Network gave insights into single parenthood and 
low-income households in Japan and how exactly they manage with the stringent working 
conditions for parents. With the interview, I gained a valuable source for future 
information as well as information that will provide my future analysis more 
opportunities. 
 
                                               
10 Also referred to as Toshima Kodomo WAKUWAKU Hoikuen 11 The interview was translated and facilitated by Yejee Choi, a fellow CEAS student. 
